

Hunterston B Nuclear Power Station

Off-site Contingency Plan




Prepared by Ayrshire Civil Contingencies Team

**on behalf of North Ayrshire Council
For the West of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership**

1 Emergency Notifications and Procedures

1.1 [REDACTED]


When an incident occurs the Hunterston Power Station Emergency Controller will use the cascade charts below (in conjunction with the telephone numbers in **Section 17.1**) to alert relevant organisations who will then cascade the information further as per the cascade.



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1.2

When an incident occurs the Hunterston Power Station Emergency Controller will use the cascade charts below (in conjunction with the telephone numbers in **Section 17.1**) to alert relevant organisations who will then cascade the information further as per the cascade.



WAY – No. 01 (Rev. 4.0)

The police have a more detailed contact list that encompasses the list above.

Plan valid to 21 May 2020

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1.3 Emergency Notification – Information Provided

When an incident occurs at the site, the on site incident cascade will be implemented and the information provided by the site will be in the form of a METHANE message as below:

M	Major Incident	Yes / No Date Time
E	Exact Location	Wind Speed Wind Direction
T	Type	Security / Nuclear / etc
H	Hazards	Present or suspected Radiological plume Chemical Security / weapons Fire
A	Access	Details of the safe routes to site RVP
N	Number of casualties / missing persons	Number: Type: Severity
E	Emergency Services	Present or Required

On arrival, all emergency personnel will be provided with a dosimeter which will measure levels of radiation and ensure that agreed limits are not reached. Emergency Staff should report to the site emergency controller (see tabard in Section 17.5).

Scottish Fire and Rescue will provide a pre-determined attendance of 3 appliances and 1 Ariel appliance incorporating 2 gas suits. In addition to this Flexi Duty Managers would also be mobilised.

A further update will be provided by the site on arrival.

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
1.4 Site Incident/Off-site Nuclear Emergency Procedure

Definition

A hazardous condition which is confined in its effect to within the boundary of the site determined in part by the site boundary monitoring systems (Emergency Plume Gamma Monitoring System (EPGMS)) data and indications

Definition

A hazardous condition which results, or is likely to result, in the need to consider urgent Countermeasures to protect the public outside the boundary of the site which may be supported by site boundary monitoring system (EPGMS) from a radiological hazard



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2.2 Distribution List

Organisation

EDF Energy – Nuclear Generation
Argyll and Bute Council
British Telecom
East Ayrshire Council
East Lothian Council
Food Standards Scotland
Glasgow Prestwick Airport
Glasgow Scientific Services
HM Coastguard (HMCG)
Magnox Ltd
Met Office
Network Rail
NHS Ayrshire and Arran
NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde
North Ayrshire Council
Office for Nuclear Regulation
Police Scotland
Public Health England CRCE
Renfrewshire Council
Scottish Ambulance Services
Scottish Environment Protection Agency
Scottish Fire and Rescue Service
Scottish Government
Scottish Water
South Ayrshire Council

- 2.2.1 Ayrshire Civil Contingencies Team (ACCT) will be responsible for the distribution of plans and amendments to the appropriate Emergency Planning liaison contacts within the relevant organisation. Each organisation is thereafter responsible for the internal promulgation and maintenance of any required plan copies held.

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2.3 Exercise /Training Record

Exercise/Training	Date
Exercise Congo – Hunterston B – Level 2	22 nd April 2004
Exercise Persephone – Hunterston A – Level 2	24 th February 2005
Exercise Indus – Hunterston B – Level 2	10 th October 2007
Exercise Kilchattan – Hunterston A – Level 2	29 th January 2008
Exercise Stour Prepare – Notification Exercise	2 nd September 2010
Exercise Stour – Hunterston B – Level 3	23 rd September 2010
Exercise Kilmory – Hunterston A – Level 2	15 th December 2010
Exercise Dawn – Notification Exercise	10 th November 2011
Exercise Bonny – Extendibility Exercise	28 th March 2012
Exercise Gannet – Media Exercise	29 th November 2012
Exercise Albatross Alert – Notification Exercise	26 th August 2013
Exercise Albatross – Hunterston A and B Level 2	24 th September 2013
Extendibility Workshop	20 th April 2016
Exercise Kestrel – Familiarisation	28 th July 2016
Exercise Kestrel – Message Support	31 st August 2016
Exercise Kestrel Prepare – Notification Exercise	31 st August 2016
Exercise Kestrel – Communications	7 th September 2016
Exercise Kestrel – STAC Training	15 th September 2016
Exercise Kestrel – Level 2 Exercise	21 st September 2016
Hunterston Familiarisation Visits	Late 2017 / early 2018
Hunterston SCC Familiarisation Training and Exercise	5 th October 2017
Hunterston Familiarisation Visits	Late 2018 / early 2019
Hunterston SCC Familiarisation Training and Exercise	13 March 2019
Hunterston STAC Training (2 sessions)	8 May 2019
Hunterston Admin/Support Staff Familiarisation Training	14 May 2019

2.4 Foreword

2.4.1 The *Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPiR)* place a statutory duty on North Ayrshire Council to prepare an Off-site Emergency Plan for Hunterston “B” Nuclear Power Station.

To ensure that there is adequate protections against accidents, REPPiR required the operator of a site to conduct a detailed safety assessment of the plant and processes. EDF Energy produces a Report of Assessment and Hazard Identification Risk Evaluation for Hunterston B Power Station. This information is provided to the local authority and the information is used to determine the planning assumptions for nuclear emergency response arrangements within this Plan.

2.4.2 It is noted that REPPiR requires that the Emergency Plan must be sufficiently flexible to deal with any reasonably foreseeable accident and extendable in the event of a more serious, but less likely accident. The Hunterston Off-site Contingency Plan is an integrated emergency management document designed to bring together the emergency arrangements of all the off-

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site agencies with a role to play in the intervention of a radiation emergency occurring at Hunterston “B” Nuclear Power Station. In addition to North Ayrshire Council the following organisations have been identified as having a role in any response and have made appropriate inputs to this plan:

EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation

British Telecom

Food Standards Scotland

Glasgow Prestwick Airport

Glasgow Scientific Services

Government Decontamination Service

HM Coastguard (HMCG)

Meteorological Office

Network Rail

NHS Ayrshire and Arran

Office for Nuclear Regulation

Police Scotland

Public Health England CRCE (Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards)

Scottish Ambulance Service

Scottish Environment Protection Agency

Scottish Fire and Rescue Service

Scottish Government

Scottish Water

2.4.3 This plan follows the consolidated guidance provided by NEPRG/BEIS

2.4.4 All correspondence in relation to this Plan should be addressed to the secretary of the Contingency Planning Liaison Group responsible for preparing this plan. The Secretary is currently the Civil Contingencies Coordinator, Newton House, Green Street Lane, Ayr, KA8 8BH.

Or by e-mail to acct@south-ayrshire.gov.uk

2.5 Glossary and Abbreviations

ACCT	Ayrshire Civil Contingencies Team deal with all matters relating to the Plan on behalf of North Ayrshire Council
ACP	Access Control Point (at site)
AFRC	Agriculture Food and Rural Communities. Directorate - Scottish Government.
AHWD	Animal Health and Welfare Division – Scottish Government
AIC	Ambulance Incident Commander

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ALARP	As low as reasonably practicable, this involves weighing a risk against the trouble, time and money needed to control it. Thus, ALARP describes the level to which we expect to see workplace risks controlled.
ALRP	Ayrshire Local Resilience Partnership
APHA	Animal Plant and Health Agency
BEIS	Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy
BT	British Telecom
CBRN	Chemical Biological Radiological or Nuclear
CCO	Civil Contingencies Officer
CESC	Central Emergency Support Centre
CGOC	Coastguard Operation Centre
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms. UK Government's dedicated crisis management facilities, which are activated in the event of an emergency requiring support and coordination at the national strategic level.
CPH(M)	Consultant in Public Health (Medicine)
CTA	Company Technical Advisor
CRT	Coastguard Rescue Team
DEPS	Duty Emergency Planning Support (Scottish Water)
DEPZ	Detailed Emergency Planning Zone
DPH	Director of Public Health
ECC	Emergency Control Centre
Effective Dose	the sum of dose to whole body from external radiation and from internal radiation
Emergency exposures	a justified and formally authorised dis-application of dose limits under IRR00 for the purpose of allowing emergency response by pre-identified people to a radiation emergency under REPPIR for the purpose of life-saving or plant intervention tasks
EPGMS	Emergency Plume Gamma Monitoring System (Site boundary monitoring system)
FSS	Food Standards Scotland
GDS	Government Decontamination Service
GLO	Government Liaison Officer
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
HMCG	HM Coastguard
Intervention Personnel	pre-identified people who respond to prevent or decrease the exposure of persons to radiation from a radiation emergency or from an event which could lead to a radiation emergency
HPS	Health Protection Scotland

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HSCC	Hunterston Strategic Coordination Centre
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
LRP	Local Resilience Partnership
MBC	Media Briefing Centre
MC	Medical Commander
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MRCC	Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
NEPRB	Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Project Board
NHS	National Health Service
OEPZ	Outline Emergency Planning Zone
ONR	Office for Nuclear Regulation
PHE CRCE	Public Health England (Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards)
PIC	Public Information Coordinator
RA	Risk Assessment
RC	Risk Communication
REPIIR	Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations 2001
RIMNET	Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network
RIO	Rail Incident Officer
RM	Risk Management
RMU	Radiation Monitoring Unit
RPA	Radiation Protection Adviser
RPID	Rural Payments and Inspections Division – Scottish Government
RRP	Regional Resilience Partnership
RVP	Rendezvous Point
RWG	Recovery Working Group
SAGE	Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (Group of scientific and technical experts that is established to provide a common source of advice to inform decisions made during the central government response to an emergency.
SCC	Strategic Coordination Centre
SCG	Strategic Coordinating-Group
SEPA	Scottish Environment Protection Agency
SGLO	Scottish Government Liaison Officer. A member of the Scottish Government Liaison Team deployed to the multi-agency coordination centre known as the SCC.

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SGoRR	Scottish Government Resilience Room
SGRED	Scottish Government Rural and Environment Directorate
SGRPID	Scottish Government Rural Payments and Inspections Directorate
SMAC	Strategic Media Advisory Cell
STAC	Scientific and Technical Advice Cell
TAG	Technical Assessment Guidance
TiiMS	The Incident Information Management System
VHF	Very High Frequency

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3 Purpose of the Plan

3.1 Purpose

- 3.1.1 In accordance with the *REPPiR Regulation 9, (Schedule 7 Part iii)* and *(Schedule 8) the Off-site Emergency Plan* is to:
1. Provide a framework for the initial response to an emergency at Hunterston “B” Nuclear Power Station to mitigate the effects of a Site Incident or Off-site Nuclear Emergency.
 2. To outline the management structure at Strategic and Tactical levels established in response to any such emergency.
 3. To highlight the roles and responsibilities of the participating agencies when responding to an emergency affecting either Site.
 4. To establish in broad terms the initial anticipated actions of the participating agencies in responding to an emergency as specified above.
 5. To provide a source of information from which relevant agencies can progress a “Procedures” manual for internal use by the staff of that agency.
 6. To describe the various counter measures which can be taken to minimise the effects of an incident and identify how these counter measures can be applied.
 7. To set out the arrangements for providing the public with specific information relating to the emergency.
 8. To outline a post emergency recovery strategy for reinstating the off-site environs to a condition as close as possible to their pre emergency status.

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4 Premises

Address:	EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation Hunterston "B" Nuclear Power Station West Kilbride, KA23 9QJ
Telephone No:	[REDACTED]
Contact:	Central Emergency Planning Group
Grid Reference:	[REDACTED]
Description of Premises:	Hunterston "B" Nuclear Power Station is a civil nuclear power station used to generate electricity.
Risks/Potential Hazards:	<p>Potential hazards at the power station arise from the presence of hazardous materials. These materials are used in, and arise from, the processes carried out on site. They include (in alphabetical order):-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ammonia Carbon Dioxide Caustic Soda Fuel Oil Hydrazine Hydrogen Methane Nitrogen Propane Radioactive fission products Sulphuric Acid <p>These materials present potential hazards, which include combustion, asphyxiation, toxicity and exposure to ionising radiation. It is estimated that the potential effects of the majority of these hazards would be restricted to the site. However, a release of radioactive material has the potential to necessitate emergency actions beyond the site boundary.</p>
Access Points:	[REDACTED]

4.1 Hunterston "B" Nuclear Power Station

4.1.1 Operating Hours/Numbers of staff on site

During Normal day shift hours: [REDACTED]

Outwith normal day shift hours: Minimum is approximately [REDACTED]

During Outage periods: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5 Emergency Organisation

5.1 Definition of Site Incident and Off-site Nuclear Emergency

- 5.1.1 A hazardous condition which is confined in its effect to within the boundary of the site determined in part by the site's boundary monitoring system data and indications (Emergency Plume Gamma Monitoring System (EPGMS))

A Site Incident does not call for the full implementation of the Contingency Plan, or, necessarily, the alerting of the offsite emergency services. However, following the activation, the Emergency Organisation detailed in this plan will be adapted to respond effectively to the specific circumstances of the event. The declaration of a Site Incident may identify when mitigating actions are required to prevent a radiation emergency occurring. To this end the possibility of a Site Incident developing into an Off-site Nuclear Emergency would be continuously assessed.

5.1.2 Off-Site Nuclear Emergency

An Off-site incident relates to a hazardous condition, which results, or is likely to result, in the need to consider urgent countermeasures to protect the public outside the boundary of the site which may be supported by EPGMS information, from a radiological hazard.

The declaration of an Off-site Nuclear Emergency identifies when mitigating action may be required to prevent a radiation emergency occurring or that a radiation emergency has begun. In this case a radiation emergency is as defined in REPPiR. (an event that is likely to result in a member of the public receiving an effective dose of 5 mSv during the year immediately following the emergency).

5.2 Objectives

- 5.2.1 For the purposes of this Plan the Emergency Organisation refers to all the participating organisations and agencies with a role to play. The primary purpose of the Emergency Organisation is to respond quickly and effectively to an incident that has created or could produce a radiological or other hazard to members of the public living near to the site. See **Section 17.5** for examples of Tabards / Surcoats which identifies the Emergency Organisation Incident Officers / Commanders.

5.3 Participating Organisations

- 5.3.1 The organisations participating in these arrangements are detailed in **Section 2.4.2** of this document.

5.4 Response of the Emergency Organisation

- 5.4.1 In the event of an Off-site Nuclear Emergency this plan calls for the following facilities to be opened, established and made operational:

[REDACTED]


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The arrangements to set up the CESC, HSCC and MBC start as soon as the declaration is made. Once the CESC is established, the Emergency Controller at the ECC hands over responsibility for advising on emergency actions outside the site to the CESC Controller and a company technical representative at the HSCC. The Emergency Controller retains responsibility for control of site activities from the ECC and for restoring the plant to a safe condition but liaison with all other organisations with duties under the emergency plan passes to the HSCC (See Section 6.8).

5.4.2 In the event of an On-site Incident, the CESC would be established, along with the MBC if required.

5.4.3 The diagram below indicates how information flows between the different centres and the site.



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5.5 Radiation Emergency Management Phases

Managing any nuclear emergency comprises three main phases:

- 5.5.1 **Preparation** (pre-planning). Preparing for radiation emergencies is an essential stage of managing any subsequent incident as it sets the conditions for the start of the response. Preparation covers the identification and training of people, the availability of infrastructure and equipment, the development of plans and operating procedures to guide coherent response activity and a validation process to ensuring these interlinked elements remain appropriate.
- 5.5.2 **Response** (mitigating an immediate risk or stopping things getting worse). The response phase comprises two separate but closely-related and often overlapping challenges:
- a) **Crisis management** - this activity covers response actions that are aimed at preventing or averting a nuclear emergency developing further. These will be focused on intervention actions taken at the site by the operator and supported by local responders and other national agencies within the nuclear industry. These actions will be supported at the local level by the SCG, led by the Strategic Coordinator with further support from the national level - the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR) in Scotland; and
 - b) **Consequence (or impact) management** – this takes place in parallel to crisis management and is concerned with steps taken to contain and control the probable impacts of a nuclear incident. It includes managing wider consequences such as the health of the public by implementing effective countermeasures. Consequence management is also known as 'Impact Management' and will be led by the SCG, led by the Strategic Coordinator and supported by national actions coordinated through SGoRR.
- 5.5.3 **Recovery** (a longer-term activity of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community) – This phase formally starts once the situation has been stabilized; i.e. the risk of further radiological release has been removed or reduced sufficiently for recovery to be warranted. However, preparation for the recovery phase will start at the HSCC during the response phase with the formation of a Recovery Coordinating Group led by a local authority Chief Officer. Recovery from a nuclear emergency may be carried out at the local, national or UK level, depending on the scale of the event and its consequences. In contrast to the response phase, the recovery process can take a considerable amount of time (months or years), as it seeks to support affected communities in the restoration of the physical infrastructure and emotional, social, economic and physical wellbeing.
- 5.5.4 Once the emergency phase has passed and the immediate hazard to the public has been mitigated by the implementation of early countermeasures, the role of the Strategic Coordinator will pass to the Chief Executive, North Ayrshire Council.

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6 Emergency Declarations, Notification and Response

6.1 Conditions for Taking Emergency Actions

- 6.1.1 The Hunterston “B” reactors are fully equipped with automatic protection systems and key reactor plant information is displayed in the control room. In the event that this information indicates abnormal conditions, for example, a sudden loss of gas pressure, an unexpected rise in reactor temperatures, a Site Incident or Off-Site Nuclear Emergency will be declared. Conditions for taking emergency action are shown within this Section at:

Table A - Site Incident (see Section 6.7)

Table B - Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (see Section 6.8)

6.2 Responsibility for Declaring or Standing Down an Emergency

- 6.2.1 **Declaration of an Emergency** - The Emergency Controller or his nominated deputy is responsible for declaring a Site Incident or Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (**Section 6.7 and 6.8**).

A declaration or initiation of the emergency response organisation will be made as early as possible when it is suspected that normal control or management of the site cannot be maintained or site lockdown is required. This enables the emergency response organisation to be in place prior to full consequences of the event occurring. **By taking a conservative and precautionary approach it is accepted that the emergency arrangements may be invoked without becoming operational.**

- 6.2.2 **Cancellation of Declaration:** The process to cancel any declaration state once the conditions of the site have been brought under control is as follows:

- Site Incident – The Site Emergency Controller may cancel the declaration; consulting with the Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC) if operational. This decision will be relayed to the Police to allow local responders to be briefed.
- Off-site Nuclear Emergency – The Site Emergency Controller, in consultation with the CESC and ONR may cancel the declaration. The SCG is to be informed of the decision through the Company Technical Advisor (CTA) to allow the wider response strategy to be updated. The STAC Chair is responsible for ordering the cessation of urgent countermeasures. The SCG will agree to cancel any Major Incident declaration.

6.3 Emergency Services and other Intervention Personnel

- 6.3.1 Arrangements for the provision of radiation protection advice and the control of exposure to radiation of employees on site are the responsibility of the site operator. The management of emergency exposure during any radiation emergency for identified site intervention personnel is detailed in the relevant On-site Emergency Plan and follows ALARP principles. Whilst the emergency services have listed below their individual intervention levels all intervention will be conducted in such a way to minimize exposure.

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- 6.3.2 Emergency exposures are exposures to ionizing radiation of intervention personnel which may be necessary to put emergency plans into effect. The management framework to be used by agencies with staff identified as being likely to deploy in the event of a radiation emergency is as follows:

Pre-Planning will:

1. Identify people who can receive emergency exposures;
2. Train and equip people to conduct likely intervention tasks;
3. Have arrangements for medical surveillance and dosimetry;
4. Name those responsible for managing emergency exposures;
5. Specify limits of emergency exposures

Implementation will:

1. Check the fitness of people who will receive emergency exposure;
2. Check properly equipped and instructed for intervention task;
3. Manage emergency exposures by limiting dose levels except in extreme circumstances to save life;
4. Assess the dose received during emergency exposure.

Record Keeping

1. Ensure dose records are kept by approved dosimetry services;
2. Provide copy of dose record to employee;
3. Report any emergency exposure and resulting action to ONR.
4. Have arrangements for medical surveillance and dosimetry;
5. Name those responsible for managing emergency exposures;
6. Specify limits of emergency exposures.

- 6.3.3 Any workers who would be required to operate in an area of potential exposure (or are already within the area of the time of the potential exposure) may be exposed to a level below 1mSv, which is in the current Ionising Radiation Regulations and adheres to the ALARP principles.

6.4 Intervention Levels – Police Scotland

- 6.4.1 Police Scotland Intervention levels (*Ionising Radiation Regulations 2017*) are as listed below:

Operational Dose Limit –

- 5 milli-Sieverts (mSv)

Emergency Dose Limits

In a radiation emergency the following Dose Limits apply:

- Emergency Exposure Dose Limit 1: 100 mSv.

This applies to simple non-life saving rescues, maintaining important plant and reducing further doses to responders and the public (as per the above guidance, Page 22, Section 3.5.12 (Figure 3.5)).

- Emergency Exposure Dose Limit 2: 500 milli-Grays (mGy).

This applies to life saving intervention only and also includes intervention to save critical infrastructure which, if not attended, may yet threaten public and / or responder life.

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The Emergency Dose Limit is dependent upon the circumstances of the incident and the individual's circumstances. For example, a female who has declared a pregnancy has a lower limit. For detailed guidance please refer to NPCC National Police Chiefs Council Operational Response to the Police Service for Operations & Incidents Involving Radiation.

6.5 Intervention Levels – Scottish Fire and Rescue Service

6.5.1 The Ionising Radiation Regulations (2017) set limits for workers. The Scottish Fire and Rescue Service have generally adopted these limits.

- **Male:** 20 mSv per year or single incident;
- **Female:** 13 mSv in any consecutive period of 3 months or (Reproductive single incident with a maximum of 20mSv per year capacity)
- **Anyone:** 100 mSv in exceptional circumstances and on a voluntary basis for life saving purposes.

6.6 Intervention Levels – Scottish Ambulance Service

6.6.1 The Scottish Ambulance Service guidance document "*The Ambulance Service guidance on dealing with radiological incidents and emergencies*" as follows:

- **Reference level one: 1 mSv** total for all staff per event. This DRL applies to all general ambulance staff that have not been identified for specialist roles such as SORT.
- **Reference level two: 5 mSv** maximum dose per event. This DRL applies to those staff who have volunteered to be involved in CBRN decontamination roles (Special Operations Response Team (SORT)).
- **Reference level three: 100 mSv** the maximum dose (**for life saving operations**) where the casualty cannot be immediately removed from the area of high dose rate or contamination. All ambulance staff can volunteer to be exposed to this level provided that they have been fully briefed and understand the implications.
- **Special Operations Response Team (SORT) annual DRL**

Due to the inner cordon role of SORT there is the potential for them to attend more than one event and receive more than one emergency exposure. Therefore the SORT DRL will be based on an **annual (whole body) dose limit of 20 mSv**.

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6.7 Table 'A' Site Incident

Declaration	Condition	Response/Actions
Site Incident	Conditions as stated in the Hunterston "B" Emergency Plan (On-site Plan), ie A hazardous condition which is confined in its effect to within the boundary of the site determined in part by Emergency Plume Gamma Monitoring System (EPGMS) data and indications	<p>Declaration by Site Emergency Controller or nominated deputy.</p> <p>Initiate notification procedures at Section 1.1</p> <p>Site staff would form an Emergency Organisation under the direction of the Site Emergency Controller, who is also responsible for providing advice to the emergency services and the NHS on any measures to protect the public and initiating all emergency action necessary to protect the workforce.</p> <p>Technical support to the site is provided by the Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC), Barnwood.</p> <p>The MBC will be opened if required.</p> <p>See Section 14 for individual Agencies agreed actions</p>

6.8 Table 'B' Off - Site Nuclear Emergency

Declaration	Condition –	Response/Actions
Off-Site Nuclear Emergency	Conditions as stated in the Hunterston "B" Emergency Plan (On-site Plan), ie A hazardous condition which results, or is likely to result, in the need to consider urgent Countermeasures to protect the public outside the boundary of the site which may be supported by (EPGMS) from a radiological hazard	<p>Declaration by Site Emergency Controller or nominated deputy.</p> <p>Initiate notification procedures at Section 1.2</p> <p>Site staff would form an Emergency Organisation under the direction of the Site Emergency Controller.</p> <p>Arrangements to set up HSCC and MBC start as soon as declaration is made.</p> <p>The site continues to provide advice until such times as CESC is operational.</p> <p>HSCC takes over responsibility for advising on off-site emergency actions and liaison with external agencies.</p> <p>The Site Emergency Controller retains responsibility for control of restoring the plant to a safe condition and liaison will take place between the Emergency Intervention personnel.</p> <p>HSCC and MBC coordinated by Strategic Coordinator (Senior Police Officer in emergency phase passing, at an agreed time to the Chief Executive of North Ayrshire Council for the recovery phase).</p> <p>The Strategic Coordinator is responsible for decisions relating to public safety.</p> <p>Technical support to the site is provided by the Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC), Barnwood.</p> <p>See Section 14 for agreed actions of individual agencies.</p>

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7 Public Information

7.1 Information to be Provided

7.1.1 Under the provisions of REPPiR the following categories of information must be provided to the public:

- Prior Information
- Information in the event of a Radiation Emergency

7.2 Prior Information to Local Residents

7.2.1 REPPiR requires that residents of the DEPZ are provided with the following information which is refreshed on an annual basis:

1. Basic facts about radioactivity and its effects on persons and the environment.
2. The various types of radiation emergency covered and their consequences for the general public and the environment.
3. Emergency measures envisaged to alert, protect and assist the general public in the event of a radiation emergency.
4. Appropriate action to be taken by the general public in the event of a radiation emergency.
5. The authority or authorities responsible for implementing the emergency measures and action referred to above.

EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation distributes calendars and radiation information leaflets incorporating prior information annually to all residents and business premises within the DEPZ.

7.3 Information to the public in the event of a radiation emergency

7.3.1 A public telephone warning system has been established by the site operator. It is the policy for EDF for the message to be activated by CESC and **not** by the Hunterston site. The undernoted message is to be passed to residents within the DEPZ without delay:

HUNTERSTON “B” MESSAGE

“This is a message from EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation. An Off-site Nuclear Emergency has been declared at Hunterston “B” Nuclear Power Station. Please stay indoors and shut all doors and windows. Take your Stable Iodine Tablets as instructed in the leaflet. Tune into local radio and television for further information.” You should also refer to the emergency arrangements contained within *Hunterston Power Stations Emergency Information for Local Residents Calendar*.

Once the message is relayed to the DEPZ, EDF should **immediately** inform Police Scotland Service Overview. The target time for EDF to carry out this is within one hour of the Off-Site Nuclear Emergency being declared

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7.3.2 HOLDING STATEMENT FOR HUNTERSTON

Police Scotland, Corporate Communications will issue the following approximate media message.

“Police Scotland and other emergency services are currently at Hunterston B Power Station, Ayrshire after a report was received of an incident occurring at (insert time) on (insert date).

Enquires are ongoing to establish the nature of the incident but early indications are that there may be a risk to the public in the immediate vicinity.

As a precaution, residents within the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone; the 2.4km area immediately surrounding the power station are being advised to take shelter indoors and tune into local television or radio stations or check social media channels for further information which will be made available as soon as the facts are confirmed.

NOTE TO NEWS EDITORS:

Staff from Police Scotland, Corporate Communications are en route and will be establishing a Media Briefing Centre [REDACTED] in due course.

Media will be alerted to the timings of the briefings once the centre is established. All further media statements on this incident will be made through the Media Briefing Centre only.”

Further statements will be discussed and agreed at the SMAC (see **Section 9.8**).

7.3.3 Agreed Guidelines

The provision of information to the public following an off-site release of radiation is a legal requirement. This provision requires coordination to ensure that consistent information is being provided by the emergency organisations at the HSCC.

This information may be provided to the public by a number of different routes:

- Directly to the media present at the media briefing centre via press releases, statements, press conferences or one-to-one interviews.
- By fax or e-mail directly to media outlets.
- Via public help lines operated by participating organisations (N.B. Police Casualty Bureau is not a public information helpline).
- By public information broadcasts on TV or radio networks
- By social media through the agencies involved twitter addresses
- Via NHS utilities such as doctor surgeries, health centres and hospitals

A Strategic Media Advice Cell (SMAC) should be established to develop strategic media issues, to coordinate the release of public information, and also to ensure that all parties who need to see the information have done so and that they are satisfied with the contents.

The arrangements for the HSCC provide for the appointment of a PIC (Public Information Coordinator) by Police Scotland who will attend the SCG meetings to ensure that information cleared for release to the public is clearly identified. Each organisation will be expected to liaise with the PIC in respect of all information routes identified above.

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The PIC will ensure that a full record of all statements issued from the HSCC and from organisations away from the Centre is maintained.

It is recognised that different organisations have different needs, however public safety must have primacy. The anxiety of any group to address its own agenda must not be allowed to divert from the primary objective of resolving the incident and getting essential information into the public domain quickly and efficiently.

It is vital that press officers work closely together, and it is important that staff remaining in public relations functions at organisational headquarters do not issue any statements without consulting their colleagues at the HSCC beforehand. It is therefore suggested that the following guidelines are followed before information is released to the media:

- All relevant press statements relating to the management of the incident must be seen by each of the agencies before they are issued. Basic company statements containing background information do not come into this category.
- All participants involved in the public relations effort must restrict their comments to areas of their own expertise. In the unlikely event of a conflict of interests between parties the PIC will arbitrate to ensure that conflicting briefings are not issued.
- **Matters relating to casualties - deceased or injured - will be handled by Police Scotland.** Under no circumstances should anyone else issue this information, as only the Police will be fully aware whether next of kin have been notified.
- All statements should be clearly marked with the name of the issuing organisation, the release number, time issued and the name of the responsible person who can be contacted for more information

Co-ordinated communications with the public through the SMAC will continue throughout the incident until its end. The specific messaging will depend on the incident but will use a range of methods including, but not limited to:

- Approved media statements;
- Media interviews;
- Social media;
- Use of the PETIS system;
- Door to door visits within the DEPZ;
- Communications with rest centres, if open;
- Internal communications within involved agencies.

8 Key Locations / Information

8.1 Hunterston Emergency Control Centre

8.2 Rendezvous Point / Forward Control Post

8.2.1

8.2.2

8.3 Media Liaison Point

8.3.1 A Media Liaison Point will be established by Police Scotland. The purpose of the Media Liaison Point is to provide a police point of contact close to the scene for members of the press and media who will be directed to attend at this location which will offer easy access and a vantage point for photographs and filming.

8.3.2 The **primary** Media Liaison Point will be established in the

8.3.3 A **secondary** Media Liaison Point may be established

8.4 Hunterston Strategic Coordination Centre - Off-site (HSCC)

8.4.1

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[REDACTED]

Established by Police Scotland the purpose of the Off-site Facility at HSCC is to relieve the load on the affected site by taking responsibility for all activities not directly concerned with rectifying the situation at the site. It is at this Centre that the various agencies will progress the strategic and tactical elements of command and control in response to the incident. (Telephone contact number is listed in **Section 17**).

Once contacted by Police Scotland the Air Traffic Watch Manager will notify the airport on call manager of a Hunterston incident. The on call manager may assist in opening the off-site facility if required.

During any incident the Air Traffic Watch Manager will monitor air traffic and re-route air traffic if necessary.

Information on the current situation can be found on the board in the SCC Coordination area or from The Incident Information Management System (TiIMS) located in the Information Centre. Full details of the functions are described within the *Hunterston Strategic Coordination Centre User Guide*.

8.5 North Ayrshire Emergency Control Centre

8.5.1 [REDACTED]

Responding to the incident North Ayrshire Council (NAC) will also provide tactical level coordination of the local authority response to the incident from their ECC, managing Council resources on any policy and advice received from the HSCC. Information relating to this facility is contained within the current version of the *NAC Emergency Control Centre Guide*.

8.6 Media Briefing Centre

8.6.1 [REDACTED]

The purpose of the MBC is to provide a single authoritative source of information concerning the emergency for the media and the public. It will also be the principal source of information to other media and public information points such as local authority information desks to ensure consistency in public statements. The MBC will include a central location for media interviews and briefings, and access to responding organisations personnel. (Telephone contact number is listed in **Section 17**).

8.7 Receiving Hospitals

8.7.1 [REDACTED]

This hospital has been designated as suitable for receiving casualties involved in an incident at Hunterston "B" Nuclear Power Station. It has facilities for dealing with patients who have been exposed to external radioactive contamination.

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Other hospitals will be designated as required by the Scottish Ambulance Service. (Telephone contact number is listed in **Section 17**).

8.8 Rest Centre(s)

8.8.1

[REDACTED]

The purpose of the Rest Centre(s) is to provide shelter for members of the public who have been displaced as a result of an incident at the Hunterston Site. From these centres, the Local Authority can make arrangements to provide for the necessary welfare needs of those displaced.

(Telephone contact number is listed in [REDACTED]).

Centres will be established by North Ayrshire Council. Where further centres are required, they can be arranged through North Ayrshire Council *Care for People Community Emergency Support Centre procedural documents*.

8.9 Radiation Monitoring Units (RMU)

8.9.1 The purpose of an RMU is to provide information on levels of radioactive contamination on or in people, by facilitating individual monitoring (also known as personal monitoring or people monitoring). This information will be used to inform decisions on some of the measures that could significantly reduce dose to individuals, and to advise and inform affected members of the public. There is Scottish Government document which provides further guidance available here <https://www.readyscotland.org/media/1399/rmu-template-plan-guidance-august-2017.pdf>

8.10 Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR)

8.10.1

[REDACTED]

On receipt of notification of a radiation emergency, the Scottish Government (SG) will activate its emergency response arrangements through the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR), and set up its emergency room in Edinburgh. The Scottish Government Liaison Officer (SGLO) at the SCC will liaise with SGoRR.

The Scottish Government's Resilience Division will lead the operation of SGoRR. SGoRR will schedule officials and ministerial meetings during the response and recovery phases. Typically, SGoRR will include participants from the main affected Scottish Government Directorates including Resilient Essential Services and representatives of relevant agencies.

In the event that UK level arrangements are initiated, SGoRR will work with COBR and other relevant UK departments, which will be available to advise and support as required.

When a Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) is activated it will provide advice to and interact with SGoRR, as well as the STAC.

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8.11 Traffic Control Points

8.11.1 By establishing the following traffic control points, vehicular movement to and from the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone can be controlled (See map at [REDACTED]) :-

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

8.12 Diversions

8.12.1 Northbound

[REDACTED]

8.12.2 Southbound

[REDACTED]

8.13 Prevailing Wind Direction

The prevailing wind for the area comes from the **south west**, so this would blow **from the site towards the north east** of the site. There is a wind rose for Prestwick on the Met Office website.

8.14 Air Traffic

Police Scotland will arrange for an airspace restriction through the Civil Aviation Liaison Officer if this is required.

8.15 Rail Traffic

British Transport Police will deal with rail traffic restrictions through the vicinity by liaising with Network Rail and the train operating companies.

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9 Coordination Arrangements of Response and Recovery

9.1 Arrival at HSCC

9.1.1 The provision of an off-site facility at the HSCC and Media Briefing Centre (MBC) are important components in the off-site emergency arrangements for Hunterston Power Station. The HSCC provides accommodation for representatives of all the agencies with a major role to play in this plan allowing a coordinated multi agency approach. Further information is detailed in the HSCC User Guide.

The HSCC will be located at [REDACTED]

9.1.2 Due to the number of people / organisations who would be expected to attend either the HSCC or the MBC and that they would be responding from a local, regional and national offices, a table below, outlining each agency and when they might expect to have people on site is provided:

Agency	Expected Response Time				
	Within 30 minutes	30 mins to 1 hour	1 to 2 hours	2 – 3 hours	More than 3 hours
British Telecom					
EDF (Torness)					
Food Standards Scotland					
HM Coastguard					
Met Office					
Network Rail					
NHS Ayrshire and Arran					
North Ayrshire Council					
Office for Nuclear Regulation					
Police Scotland					
Public Health England CRCE					
Scottish Ambulance Services					
SEPA					
Scottish Fire and Rescue Service					
Scottish Government					
Scottish Water					

The above response times may be increased if an event occurs outwith normal working hours.

Teleconference facilities are available for each meeting and the times of the meetings are available by contacting the Security Desk at HSCC on [REDACTED]

9.2 HSCC User Guide

9.2.1 A *User Guide* has been produced by the Emergency Planning Group, EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation, Barnett Way, Barnwood, Gloucestershire GL4 3RS, based on NEPRG guidance, in consultation with members of the Emergency Planning Consultative Committee.

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- 9.2.2 Full details of the facility layout, equipment availability and information sources can be found detailed in the HSCC User Guide, available within the HSCC.
- 9.2.3 In the initial stages of the incident and the HSCC being opened, Police Scotland will carry out the function of Registration and temporary Office Manager until the EDF representatives arrive when it will be further discussed with Torness representatives and Police Scotland.
- 9.2.4 Those attending the HSCC gain entry as follows:
- Press the bell for attention and proceed to register at the security desk;
 - Representatives will be required to produce photographic identification;
 - Sign in at the security desk
 - Attend briefing area for initial briefing on the ongoing incident and their roles within the HSCC
 - After the briefing representatives will then be directed to their designated desks.
 - Ensure to keep checking the TV screens / monitors around the centre as these may have more up to date information
- 9.2.5 Information on the current situation can be found on the board in the SCC Coordination area, the TV screens / monitors or from The Incident Information Management Systems (TiIMS) located in the Briefing Area. Any queries regarding the facility or facilities provided / available should be directed to the SCC Coordinator (Police Scotland) when the centre is in use and to EDF Energy Emergency Planning at other times.
- 9.2.6 The EDF Energy Company Team at the HSCC will be able to support multi-agency partners to access relevant information on The Incident Information Management System (TiIMS) and will provide updates on the situation at the site. Until the Company Team arrive, partners at the HSCC can contact the EDF Energy CESC for support on locating information on TiIMS. These will then be used to provide an update of the current situation at meetings and for the updates boards, etc
- 9.2.7 Agencies are advised to bring Wi-Fi enabled computers if they require dedicated access to the Internet. The HSCC does not have a computer printer. Agencies are advised to bring a printer compatible with their computer if they require to print data.
- 9.2.8 Connection instructions for the Wi-Fi internet access are included in the HSCC User Guide.
- 9.2.9 Teleconference facilities are available within the HSCC as below:

	Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) / Tactical Group	Strategic Media Advisory Cell (SMAC)	Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) / Recovery Working Group
Toll Number			
Toll Free Number			
Participant PIN Code			
Moderator PIN Code			
Customer Service (in case of difficulties)			

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Multi-agency partners who are likely to take some time to reach the HSCC and will therefore be required to teleconference into the meetings should make contact with Police Scotland at the Security Desk in the HSCC ([REDACTED]) to ascertain when the first meetings of these groups are scheduled.

- 9.2.10 The Centre uses a Message Action system to pass information throughout the centre and a sample of form and instructions are contained within the *HSCC User Guide*.

9.3 Roles / Membership Of Decision Making And Advisory Groups

- 9.3.1 The purpose of this section is to clarify the role and composition of the various decision making/advisory groups operating within the HSCC and their interface during the emergency phase of an incident.

- 9.3.2 Model agendas for the Strategic Coordinating Group, the STAC, Recovery Issues and Strategic Media Advice Cell Sub-Groups are contained later within this Section. These model agendas are for guidance purposes only and it is for the Chairperson of each group / sub-group to modify the agenda to meet the needs of the situation.

- 9.3.3 It is incumbent on each individual agency to maintain a comprehensive record of all actions undertaken during an incident for evidential referral in any subsequent enquiry. There is a basic template document available to maintain a log of messages / replies and actions. A copy of this template is available within the HSCC User Guide for information. Each agency is responsible for maintaining their own participatory record.

9.4 Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG)

- 9.4.1 This senior group will only be composed of members whose role it is to make strategic decisions on behalf of their agency. The group must be small and dynamic, coming together for focused meetings, and armed with sufficient information from their own agency to allow group strategic issues to be discussed and decisions made.

9.4.2 SCG - Roles Of Members

Strategic Coordinator (Police Scotland - senior ranking officer).

- Chairs the SCG and coordinates the emergency response phase, towards the restoration of normality.
- Declares when the HSCC and MBC are operational.
- Overall responsibility for the management of the MBC and determining the timing and representation at multi-agency media briefings. The views of appropriate organisations will be taken into consideration.
- Appoint an MBC Manager. All media representatives from participating organisations will be expected to work as a coordinated team at the MBC.
- Appoint a Public Information Coordinator (PIC) and all media representatives from participating organisations will be expected to work as a coordinated team.
- In the Recovery Phase of an incident the Chief Executive or their nominee of North Ayrshire Council will fulfil this role or their nominees.

Tactical Commander ('Police U' Division Commander or representative)

- Informs the SCG of all issues arising from the Tactical Group requiring strategic direction, and implements the decisions of the SCG.

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Public Information Coordinator (Police Scotland Corporate Communications Representative)

- Advises the SCG on any key issues of public/media concern from all agencies and on the media/information strategy.
- Implements decisions of the SCG requiring dissemination of information to the public.

Scottish Fire and Rescue (Senior ranking officer)

- Responsible for apprising the SCG of fire service activity during the emergency phase of the incident.
- Work within a coordinated team and provide an overview of fire service activity to be included in media briefing.
- Provide relevant information relating to fire service activity off site which may impact on the on site incident during the emergency / recovery phase.
- Ensure appropriate decision making logs and contemporaneous notes are recorded and made available to SCG.

Scottish Ambulance Service (Senior ranking officer)

- Advises the SCG on matters related to the Scottish Ambulance Service response to the incident.
- Communicates with the various Scottish Ambulance Service command structures involved, including Tactical Commander and the National Command & Coordination Centre

North Ayrshire Council (Chief Executive or nominated representative)

- Supports the emergency services during the emergency phase and advises the SCG of matters pertaining to recovery.
- Prepares to take over the coordination role from Police Scotland when the emergency phase is over.

STAC Chair (Director of Public Health or nominated rep)

- Informed by the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC), he/she advises the SCG on the effects of the emergency and the appropriate countermeasures to be implemented to protect the public and personnel.

NHS Ayrshire and Arran (Chief Executive or nominated rep)

- Advises the SCG on matters related to the NHS response to the incident.

EDF Energy

- Sends a Company Technical Advisor (CTA) who will advise the SCG on the effect of the emergency on site and its prognosis. The CTA will liaise with the ONR representative and advise of any concerns in making strategic decisions. The CESC Controller will teleconference into the SCG meetings to provide EDF updates until the CTA arrives.
- Until the arrival of the PHE - CRCE representative, the CTA will also provide advice on the effects on the environment off site and the appropriate measures to protect the public.
- Until the STAC is established, the CTA will also provide advice on the effects off site.

Scottish Government (Liaison Officer)

- Advises the SCG on national level issues/decisions and implements all strategic decisions requiring national level support. The representative must ensure that the SCG takes account of any Scottish Ministerial concerns.

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Office for Nuclear Regulation

- Provides advice to Government

The following officials will not sit at the table but MAY be required to support their agency representative:

- Police Staff Officer and Police Emergencies Procedure Adviser;
- North Ayrshire Council - Chair of Recovery Group;

Other organisations, eg, *SEPA; Scottish Water; BT; HM Coastguard; Food Standards Scotland; Met Office; Network Rail; PHE CRCE*

Police Strategic Minute Taker will also attend meetings. SCG meetings must be timed to support members' attendance at Tactical, STAC and RWG meetings.

9.5 Tactical Group

- 9.5.1 The Tactical Group will be chaired by the Police Tactical Commander and meet initially until the first Strategic Meeting. Following this meeting the Police Tactical Commander will call meetings of the Tactical Group, as and when necessary to pass on strategic decisions and report issues/advice back to Strategic.

The role of the Tactical Group is to implement the strategic decisions made by the SCG and is the principal forum where all agencies meet to assess information and implement measures.

9.5.2 Tactical Group - Roles Of Members

The following are key members of the Tactical Group. Representatives from other agencies will join if / when appropriate.

Police Tactical Commander

- Chairs Tactical Group and manages all Police actions through the COSC police cell.
- Is a member of the SCG and informs the SCG of all issues arising from Tactical Group requiring Strategic direction and implements the decisions of the SCG

Scottish Fire and Rescue Service Senior Officer

- Manages all Scottish Fire and Rescue Service actions through the HSCC fire and rescue cell.

Scottish Ambulance Service Senior Officer

- Manages all ambulance service activities and communicates with the Ambulance Incident Officer.

HM Coastguard (HMCG)

- Manages all maritime activities.

North Ayrshire Council Representative

- Manages all of the local authority and liaises with the NAC ECC when established.

NHS Ayrshire & Arran Representative

- Manages all NHS activities

Scottish Resilience

- Links to the Scottish Government Departments at Tactical level.

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Other members

- Representative of the **STAC**;
- Representative of the **Recovery Working Group**;
- Representative of **Food Standards Scotland**.

A Police Tactical Minute taker will attend meetings. The Tactical Group must be timed to support member's attendance at SCG, STAC/RWG meetings.

9.6 Scientific And Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

9.6.1 In the event of a radiation emergency, it is vital that the Police Strategic Coordinator and the members of the SCG are given clear authoritative advice on the effects of the emergency on public health, environmental, scientific, technical and on the appropriate off-site countermeasures to be implemented to deal effectively with the immediate and long-term consequences of an incident at Hunterston. There is a need to ensure that this advice is coordinated.

The STAC should have a standard core membership to ensure consistency and to support a rapid response. Thereafter the composition of the STAC can be tailored to reflect the nature, scope and scale of the specific incident, as agreed with the SCG or Tactical Chair.

A meeting of the **STAC core group should be held as quickly as possible** to carry out initial health and environmental risk assessment and to identify the ongoing requirements for specialist advice to the SCG and/or Tactical. In some circumstances the initial STAC discussions and advice to the lead responder can be made by telephone. Adequate contact arrangements should therefore be in place.

9.6.2 STAC – Roles Of Members

STAC Chair - The STAC should initially be chaired by a senior representative of the local NHS Board, normally the Director of Public Health or a Consultant in Public Health (Medicine). The Chair of STAC will be required to liaise with the Chair of SAGE during the incident. The chair of the STAC may change as the incident progresses but only when there are no issues in relation to public health to consider.

Deputy Chair - In order that coordinated work in the STAC group continues during periods when the Chair is reporting to the main SCG Strategic or to other groups, a member of the STAC should be briefed to act as a deputy chair.

Leadership - Irrespective of which agency chairs the STAC, the chairperson should have the relevant skills/experience to chair complex technical meetings, in order to fulfil the remit of the cell in providing coordinated advice. The lead individual should be someone at an appropriate level of seniority within their agency.

Training - Ideally, STAC chairpersons should have undergone specific training to familiarise themselves with the requirements of the role.

Core members of the STAC:

- NHS – Director of Public Health/Consultant in Public Health Medicine;
- ONR;
- Local Authority – Senior Environmental Health Officer;
- Scottish Fire & Rescue Service – HAZMAT Officer/Local Scientific Adviser;

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- Public Health England - CRCE – Consultant;
- SEPA Representative;
- EDF Representative.

Additional members may include:

- NHS Radiation Protection Adviser;
- Food Standards Scotland (FSS);
- Scottish Government, Agriculture, Food and Rural Communities
- Scottish Government, Rural Payments and Inspection Division (RPID)
- Police Scotland
- Scottish Water;
- Met Office.
- SAGE Chair or nominated rep (via Teleconference)

STAC meetings must be timed to support members' attendance at SCG, Tactical and RWG meetings.

STAC Support Team

A dedicated Support Team from NHS Ayrshire and Arran will be required to facilitate the STAC. The role and responsibilities of the Support Team are:

- Operating the STAC function for the duration of the incident;
- Recording and logging all calls to and requests for advice from the STAC;
- Maintaining action and decision logs and producing minutes of STAC meetings;
- Maintaining a "focus board" or equivalent to record live issues and status of STAC actions;
- Maintaining a current STAC members briefing board listing all current STAC members and chair; and
- Any additional practical and facility support as requested by the STAC chair.

Further details can be found within the *WoSRRP STAC Plan*.

9.7 Recovery Working Group (RWG)

- 9.7.1 Although the role of the RWG comes into its own when the emergency phase is over, **it is essential that recovery is considered as soon as it is apparent that off-site contamination is likely to occur.** The RWG will therefore establish a core group at the **outset of a radiation emergency.**

The role of the RWG is to characterise the extent and nature of the off-site contamination, and identify options and strategies for clean-up of contamination and disposal of wastes, taking into account the principles of justification and optimisation.

It should identify priorities, timescales and costs for the options, propose options for consideration by the SCG and prepare plans for their implementation through the Tactical Group. It will advise on/assess recovery monitoring and maintain records of actions (see Section 13 for further information on Recovery Protocols).

During the emergency phase the RWG Chair will present advice to the SCG through the Chief Executive, North Ayrshire Council.

9.7.2 RWG - Roles Of Members

The membership of the RWG needs to be flexible to respond to the specific circumstances, but the core membership will be as follows:

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North Ayrshire Council – Most appropriate Chief Officer

- Chairs the RWG.

NHS Ayrshire & Arran – Most appropriate Officer

- Provides advice on health aspects.

STAC representative - Consultant in Public Health Medicine

- Provides Public Health Advice.

Public Health England – Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards

- Provision of protection advice and information.

Scottish Environment Protection Agency

- Provides advice on effects on the environment.

Scottish Government – Rural Affairs & Environment

- Provides advice on practicalities of intervention.

Food Standards Scotland

- Provides advice on contamination of the food chain.

Scottish Water

- Provides advice on the effects on public water supplies and the wastewater infrastructure.

Police Scotland

- Provides assistance with public order issues.

Scottish Fire and Rescue Service

- Provides specialist advice on HAZMAT materials.
- Apprise SCG of fire service activity in the recovery phase of an incident.

Met Office

- Predict plume characteristics based on weather forecast information.

RWG meetings must be timed to support members' attendance at SCG, Tactical and STAC.

Model agendas for the Strategic Coordinating Group, the STAC, Recovery Issues and Strategic Media Advice Cell Sub-Groups are contained later within this Section. These model agendas are for guidance purposes only and it is for the Chairperson of each group / sub-group to modify the agenda to meet the needs of the situation.

The transfer of coordination will be by mutual agreement and will be recorded in writing. Guidance for the Recovery Phase handover criteria is shown at Section 9.14.

9.8 Strategic Media Advice Cell (SMAC)

- 9.8.1 The primary purpose of the SMAC is to advise the SCG on media strategy and to ensure consistent communication with the media. It is not media facing but is designed to formulate strategy and propose key avenues of delivery. The SMAC brings together media representatives of the key organisations involved.

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The SMAC will ensure that statements are issued regularly from the SCG and should include statements which can be put onto a variety of social media sites.

When the event moves into the recovery phase, the leadership of the SMAC is assumed by the Local Authority Press Officer.

9.8.2 SMAC - Roles Of Members

The membership of the SMAC needs to be flexible to respond to the specific circumstances, but the core membership will be as follows:

Public Information Coordinator (Police Scotland Corporate Communications Representative)

- Advises the SCG on any key issues of public/media concern from all agencies and on the media/information strategy.
- Implements decisions of the SCG requiring dissemination of information to the public.
- Chairs the SMAC

North Ayrshire Council – Most Senior Communications Officer

- Attends the SMAC and chairs the group in the Recovery phase.

NHS Ayrshire & Arran – Communications Officer

- Provides advice on health aspects from STAC and NHS.

Scottish Fire and Rescue Service representative

- Provide information on behalf of the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service

EDF – Most senior Communications Officer

- Provides information on behalf of the operator.

Other organisations, eg, *SEPA; Scottish Water; BT; Met Office; Network Rail; PHE CRCE*

SMAC meetings must be timed to support members' attendance at SCG.

Model agendas for the Strategic Coordinating Group, the Tactical Coordinating Group, the STAC, Strategic Media Advice Cell and Recovery Sub-Groups are contained later within this Section. These model agendas are for guidance purposes only and it is for the Chairperson of each group / sub-group to modify the agenda to meet the needs of the situation.

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9.9.1 Strategic Coordinating Group Initial Agenda

**AGENDA FOR HUNTERSTON
STRATEGIC COORDINATING GROUP (Initial)**

TIME/DATE:

LOCATION:

CHAIRPERSON:

MINUTES:

Agenda items are subject to a Closed Minute as the disclosure of any information would substantially prejudice the safeguarding of National Security.

1. Introductions
2. Strategy
3. Strategic Matters Requiring Urgent Action/Decisions
4. Strategic Level Incident Situation Report
5. Site Situation Update
6. Radiation Monitoring/Levels/Weather (plume prediction)
7. Health Issues
 - a. Countermeasures
 - b. Casualties
 - c. Establish Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) chaired by Health Board
8. Access to/Control of Affected Area: Road/Rail/Air/Sea – Strategic Issues
9. Public Information and Media Issues
 - a. Establish a (SMAC) chaired by Police Corporate Communications Representative
10. Recovery Issues
 - a. Establish a Recovery Working Group (RWG) chaired by the Local Authority
11. Other Strategic Issues
12. Review of Actions and Strategy
13. Time of Next Meeting



CHAIRS OF MEETINGS SHOULD CONSIDER THE TIMINGS OF THIS MEETING TO ALLOW OTHER GROUPS TO MEET AND FEED INTO THE STRATEGIC GROUP ACCORDINGLY

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Strategic Coordinating Group: Sederunt

Organisation	Name of Representative	
Police Scotland: Strategic Coordinator (most senior ranking officer)		
Police Scotland: Tactical Commander (U Division Commander or representative)		
Police Scotland Public Information Coordinator (Police Public Comms representative)		
Scottish Fire and Rescue (most senior ranking officer)		
Scottish Ambulance Service (most senior ranking officer)		
STAC Chair (Director of Public Health or representative)		
NHS Ayrshire and Arran Chief Executive (or representative)		
North Ayrshire Council Chief Executive (or representative)		
EDF Energy: Company Technical Advisor		
Scottish Government: Resilience Senior Representative		
Office for Nuclear Regulation		
Others who may attend:		
Police Scotland: Staff Officer		
Police Scotland: Emergency Procedures Advisor		
North Ayrshire Council: Chair of the Recovery Group		
SEPA		
Scottish Water		
HM Coastguard		
Food Standards Scotland		
Network Rail		
Met Office		
PHE-CRCE		
British Telecom		

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9.9.2 Strategic Coordinating Group Agenda (subsequent meetings)

**AGENDA FOR HUNTERSTON
STRATEGIC COORDINATING GROUP (subsequent Meetings)**

TIME/DATE:

LOCATION:

CHAIRPERSON:

MINUTES:

Agenda items are subject to a Closed Minute as the disclosure of any information would substantially prejudice the safeguarding of National Security.

1. introductions
2. Strategy
3. Strategic Matters Requiring Urgent Action/Decisions
4. Approval Of Minutes And Outstanding Actions Update
5. Strategic Level Incident Situation Report
6. Site Situation Update
7. Radiation Monitoring/Levels/Weather (plume prediction)
8. Health Issues
 - a. Countermeasures
 - b. Casualties
 - c. Update from Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) chaired by Health Board
9. Access to/Control of Affected Area: Road/Rail/Air/Sea – Strategic Issues
10. Public Information and Media Issues
 - a. Update from SMAC chaired by Police Corporate Communications Representative
11. Recovery Issues
 - a. Update from Recovery Working Group (RWG) chaired by the Local Authority
12. Other Strategic Issues
13. Review of Actions and Strategy
14. Time of Next Meeting



CHAIRS OF MEETINGS SHOULD CONSIDER THE TIMINGS OF THIS MEETING TO ALLOW OTHER GROUPS TO MEET AND FEED INTO THE STRATEGIC GROUP ACCORDINGLY

WAY – No. 01 (Rev. 4.0)

Plan valid to 21 May 2020

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Strategic Coordinating Group: Sederunt

Organisation	Name of Representative	
Police Scotland: Strategic Coordinator (most senior ranking officer)		
Police Scotland: Tactical Commander (U Division Commander or representative)		
Police Scotland Public Information Coordinator (Police Public Comms representative)		
Scottish Fire and Rescue (most senior ranking officer)		
Scottish Ambulance Service (most senior ranking officer)		
STAC Chair (Director of Public Health or representative)		
NHS Ayrshire and Arran Chief Executive (or representative)		
North Ayrshire Council Chief Executive (or representative)		
EDF Energy: Company Technical Advisor		
Scottish Government: Resilience Senior Representative		
Office for Nuclear Regulation		
Others who may attend:		
Police Scotland: Staff Officer		
Police Scotland: Emergency Procedures Advisor		
North Ayrshire Council: Chair of the Recovery Group		
SEPA		
Scottish Water		
HM Coastguard		
Food Standards Scotland		
Network Rail		
Met Office		
PHE-CRCE		
British Telecom		

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9.10.1 Tactical Coordinating Group Model Agenda

**AGENDA FOR HUNTERSTON POWER STATION
TACTICAL COORDINATING GROUP**

TIME/DATE:

LOCATION:

CHAIRPERSON:

MINUTES:

Agenda items are subject to a Closed Minute as the disclosure of any information would substantially prejudice the safeguarding of National Security.

1. Introduction And Strategy
2. Urgent Matters Requiring Immediate Actions
3. Incident Situation Report
4. Site Situation Update
5. Radiation Monitoring/Levels/Weather (plume prediction)
6. Agency Situation Reports And Issues
7. Health Issues
 - a. Early Countermeasures
 - b. Later Countermeasures
 - c. Casualties
8. Cordons/Containment Issues – Road/Rail/Air/Sea
9. Public Information And Media Issues
10. Human Resources
11. Logistics
12. Recovery Planning/Community Impact
13. Investigation Issues
14. Other Issues
15. Review Of Actions And Strategy
16. Time Of Next Meeting



**CHAIRS OF MEETINGS SHOULD CONSIDER THE TIMINGS OF THIS MEETING TO ALLOW
OTHER GROUPS TO MEET AND FEED INTO THE STRATEGIC GROUP ACCORDINGLY**

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Tactical Coordinating Group: Sederunt

Organisation	Name of Representative	
Police Scotland: Tactical Commander (U Division Commander or representative)		
Scottish Fire and Rescue (a senior ranking officer)		
Scottish Ambulance Service (a senior ranking officer)		
HM Coastguard		
North Ayrshire Council Head of Service (or representative)		
Recovery Working Group Representative		
NHS Ayrshire and Arran (representative)		
Scottish Government: Resilience Senior Representative		
STAC Representative		
Recovery Working Group Representative		
Food Standards Scotland		
Others who may attend:		
SEPA		
Scottish Water		
Network Rail		
Met Office		
PHE-CRCE		
British Telecom		

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9.10.2 Tactical Coordinating Group Model Agenda (Subsequent Meetings Agenda)

**AGENDA FOR HUNTERSTON POWER STATION
TACTICAL COORDINATING GROUP**

TIME/DATE:

LOCATION:

CHAIRPERSON:

MINUTES:

Agenda items are subject to a Closed Minute as the disclosure of any information would substantially prejudice the safeguarding of National Security.

1. Introduction and Strategy
2. Urgent Matters Requiring Immediate Actions
3. Approval Of Minutes And Outstanding Actions Update
4. Incident Situation Report
5. Site Situation Update
6. Radiation Monitoring/Levels/Weather (plume prediction)
7. Agency Situation Reports And Issues
8. Health Issues
 - a. Early Countermeasures
 - b. Later Countermeasures
 - c. Casualties
9. Cordons/Containment – Road/Rail/Air/Sea
10. Public Information And Media Issues
11. Human Resources
12. Logistics
13. Recovery Planning/Community Impact
14. Investigation Issues
15. Other Issues
16. Review Of Actions And Strategy
17. Time Of Next Meeting



**CHAIRS OF MEETINGS SHOULD CONSIDER THE TIMINGS OF THIS MEETING TO ALLOW
OTHER GROUPS TO MEET AND FEED INTO THE STRATEGIC GROUP ACCORDINGLY**

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Tactical Coordinating Group: Sederunt (extract from Initial Tactical Agenda)

Organisation	Name of Representative	
Police Scotland: Tactical Commander (U Division Commander or representative)		
Scottish Fire and Rescue (a senior ranking officer)		
Scottish Ambulance Service (a senior ranking officer)		
HM Coastguard		
North Ayrshire Council Head of Service (or representative)		
Recovery Working Group Representative		
NHS Ayrshire and Arran (representative)		
Scottish Government: Resilience Senior Representative		
STAC Representative		
Recovery Working Group Representative		
Food Standards Scotland		
Others who may attend:		
SEPA		
Scottish Water		
Network Rail		
Met Office		
PHE-CRCE		
British Telecom		

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9.11 Scientific and Technical Advice Cell Model Agendas (Initial and Subsequent)

Sample Agenda For First STAC Meeting

(Meeting should be maximum 20 - 30 minutes)

- 1. Introductions and apologies**
- 2. STAC Members' Introductory Briefing**
 - 2.1 Check membership – (Missing agencies?)
 - 2.2 Outline organisational context
 - Role of SCG & STAC
 - Role of STAC Chair
 - Role of STAC Members
 - 2.3 Describe STAC / SCG operational procedures
 - Ground rules for STAC
 - Main tasks – Health Risk Analysis (RA, RM, RC)
 - STAC / SCG Procedures
 - Minutes / action tasks
 - Communications logging
 - Personal logging
 - Handover and personnel change-over procedure
- 3. Current incident situation and any action taken to date on health aspects. (RRP Briefing – NB: METHANE acronym)**
- 4. Initial Risk Analysis**
 - 4.1 Risk Assessment
 - Present situation, risk to public health
 - Potential risks if situation worsened
 - Explore risk scenarios
 - Agree initial risk assessment for SCG
 - 4.2 Risk Management
 - Consider options
 - Sheltering, evacuation, monitoring, decontamination
 - Prophylaxis / antidotes / treatment
 - Food, water, milk.
 - Agree advice on risk management for SCG

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4.3 Risk Communication

- Identify key messages
- Identify target groups:-
 - General public
 - NHS
 - A&E, Hospital
 - Primary Care
 - NHS24
 - Local Authority – Education, Social Work, others
 - Other targets
- Agree communication messages for SCG
- Agree responsibilities for transmitting communications with media / communications staff
-

5. Review any other outstanding issues from members
6. Agree items for action and allocate tasks
7. Remind membership of timescales, shift requirements, role of STAC Manager, practical arrangements.
8. Shift hand-over arrangements
9. Agree times when STAC will convene
10. AOB

(extracted from the WoSRRP STAC Plan, June 2016 V2.4)



CHAIRS OF MEETINGS SHOULD CONSIDER THE TIMINGS OF THIS MEETING TO ALLOW OTHER GROUPS TO MEET AND FEED INTO THE STRATEGIC GROUP ACCORDINGLY

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STAC (Scientific, Technical Advice Cell: Sederunt

Organisation	Name of Representative	
CORE MEMBERS		
NHS Ayrshire and Arran STAC Chair (Dir. Public Health Medicine or representative)		
STAC DEPUTY Chair (nominated by the Chair)		
Office for Nuclear Regulation		
North Ayrshire Council (Senior Environmental Health Officer)		
Scottish Fire and Rescue (HAZMAT Officer / Local Scientific Advisor)		
PHE-CRCE (Consultant)		
SEPA (Representative)		
EDF Energy (Health Physicist) (Representative)		
ADDITIONAL MEMBERS		
NHS Ayrshire and Arran (Radiation Protection Adviser)		
Scottish Government Agriculture, Food and Rural Communities Representative		
Scottish Government Rural Payments and Inspection Division (RPID) Representative		
Police Scotland (Representative)		
Scottish Water (Representative)		
Met Office (Representative)		
SAGE Chair (or nominated representative) (via teleconference)		

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Sample Agenda For Subsequent STAC Meetings

(Meetings should be maximum 20 minutes)

- 1. Introductions and apologies**
Review introduction for new members and reminder of STAC role and organisational procedures.
Review minutes and action from previous meeting
- 2. Situation update and feedback from SCG meetings**
 - Actions taken to limit hazard / protect public health
 -
- 3. Review Health Risk Analysis and agree updated advice**
 - Risk Assessment
 - Risk Management options
 - Risk Communication messages
- 4. Review any other outstanding issues from members**
- 5. Agree items for action and allocate tasks**
- 6. Shift hand-over arrangements**
- 7. Agree time when STAC will next convene**
- 8. AOB**

(extracted from the WoSRRP STAC Plan, June 2016 V2.4)



CHAIRS OF MEETINGS SHOULD CONSIDER THE TIMINGS OF THIS MEETING TO ALLOW OTHER GROUPS TO MEET AND FEED INTO THE STRATEGIC GROUP ACCORDINGLY

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STAC (Scientific, Technical Advice Cell: Sederunt

Organisation	Name of Representative	
CORE MEMBERS		
NHS Ayrshire and Arran (Dir. Public Health Medicine or representative)	STAC Chair	
	STAC Deputy Chair (nominated by the Chair)	
Office for Nuclear Regulation		
North Ayrshire Council (Senior Environmental Health Officer)		
Scottish Fire and Rescue (HAZMAT Officer / Local Scientific Advisor)		
PHE-CRCE (Consultant)		
SEPA (Representative)		
EDF Energy (Health Physicist) (Representative)		
ADDITIONAL MEMBERS		
NHS Ayrshire and Arran (Radiation Protection Adviser)		
Scottish Government Agriculture, Food and Rural Communities Representative		
Scottish Government Rural Payments and Inspection Division (RPID) Representative		
Police Scotland (Representative)		
Scottish Water (Representative)		
Met Office (Representative)		
SAGE Chair (or nominated representative) (via teleconference)		

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9.12 Strategic Media Advisory Cell Model Agenda

STRATEGIC MEDIA ADVISORY CELL

MODEL AGENDA

(FOR GUIDANCE ONLY - actual agenda content will be at the discretion of the Working Group Chairperson)

1. Attendance apologies
2. Chairperson's remarks
3. Outstanding actions of feedback from last press conference
4. Communications Strategy
5. Roles and Tasks
6. Issues from Strategic Coordinating Group
7. Issues from other Agencies
8. Emerging Media issues
 - Casualties
 - Monitoring
 - Countermeasures
 - Traffic Management
 - Media coverage and social media sentiment
9. Contents of Press Releases
10. Other key issues
11. Time of next meeting



CHAIRS OF MEETINGS SHOULD CONSIDER THE TIMINGS OF THIS MEETING TO ALLOW OTHER GROUPS TO MEET AND FEED INTO THE STRATEGIC GROUP ACCORDINGLY

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9.13 Recovery Working Group Model Agenda

RECOVERY WORKING GROUP

MODEL AGENDA

(FOR GUIDANCE ONLY - actual agenda content will be at the discretion of the Working Group Chairperson)

1. Attendance and apologies
2. Chairperson's remarks
3. Outstanding actions
4. Issues from Strategic Co-ordinating Group
5. TiIMS (The Incident Information Management System) Update
6. Continuing Health Issues including restrictions on consumption of agricultural/ marine produce
7. Extent of environmental contamination
8. Feasibility of and options for decontamination
9. Need for and sources of specialist equipment/personnel
10. Long term environmental monitoring programme
11. Long term restriction on access
12. Support of evacuated persons including long/short term re -housing, financial support, legal advice etc.
13. Compensation
14. Recovery issues input to public information and press releases
15. Other key issues
16. Time of next meeting



CHAIRS OF MEETINGS SHOULD CONSIDER THE TIMINGS OF THIS MEETING TO ALLOW OTHER GROUPS TO MEET AND FEED INTO THE STRATEGIC GROUP ACCORDINGLY

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Recovery Working Group: Sederunt

Organisation	Name of Representative	
North Ayrshire Council Chair Senior Environmental Health (or representative)		
NHS Ayrshire and Arran		
STAC Representative		
PHE-CRCE		
SEPA		
Scottish Government Rural Affairs and Environment Representative		
Food Standards Scotland		
Scottish Water		
Police Scotland:		
Scottish Fire and Rescue (HAZMAT Officer / Local Scientific Advisor)		
Met Office		

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9.14 Recovery Phase Handover Criteria

**STRATEGIC COORDINATING GROUP
RECOVERY PHASE HANDOVER CRITERIA**

The following are suggested criteria that may be appropriate to help determine when or if a handover can take place between the police and local authority as efforts move from response to recovery.

- The Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) has declared the On-site incident contained and no significant risk of reoccurrence
- Public safety countermeasures in place and working effectively
- No significant issues remain to be resolved from the early post - incident phase
- NAC is satisfied that it has in place the staff, infrastructure and processes to take over coordination from the Police and there is an agreed process for the phased transition of support functions.
- The HSCC is functioning effectively and has the necessary:
 - ❖ Resourcing
 - ❖ Communications
 - ❖ Logging and media coordination support
- Individual organisations are functioning effectively with
 - ❖ Resourcing
 - ❖ Communications
 - ❖ Management of outstanding issues
- Central Government supports the hand-over
- North Ayrshire Council is able to accept Chairmanship of the Strategic Coordinating Group
- The senior Representative of Police Scotland and the Chief Executive, North Ayrshire Council are both in support of the hand-over
- Other key issues

Further details on Recovery Protocols can be found at Section 13.

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9.15 Suggested Handover Certificate

Suggested Handover Certificate

[Note: This certificate has been written assuming the Strategic Coordination Group is being chaired by the police and the Recovery Group is being chaired by the local authority]

Upon this Status Certificate being signed by both the Local Authority and the Police, the Command and Control for dealing with the aftermath of the incident is to be taken over by North Ayrshire Council.

In addition to any requirements laid out in specific contingency plans relevant to this emergency:

1. There is no known further risk to life in relation to this specific emergency.
2. The circumstances dictate it more appropriate for Command and Control to rest with North Ayrshire Council in that the phase is clearly now one of recovery.
3. There are no serious public order or crime prevention issues which impact on the overall strategic coordination of the recovery phase.
4. Scottish Fire and Rescue Service together with the Scottish Ambulance Service are operating at a level which does not necessitate a Strategic Coordination Group to coordinate and facilitate their activity.
5. There are no known scenarios which may require the reinstatement of the Local Resilience Partnership in relation to this emergency in the foreseeable future.
6. North Ayrshire Council is satisfied that it has in place the infrastructure and processes to take over coordination from the Police.

Signed:

North Ayrshire Council

Signed:

Police Scotland

Date and Time Signed:

(extracted from the NAC Civil Contingencies Response and Recovery Plan 2016 (with minor amendments to reflect inclusion of Strategic Coordinating Group)

10 Detailed Emergency Planning Zone Arrangements

10.1 The Detailed Emergency Planning Zone

- 10.1.1 The reasonably foreseeable accident scenario that leads to the largest and worst case off-site release is called the **reference release** – the accident against which it is considered reasonable to prepare detailed emergency plans. The reference off-site release is used to define a zone closely surrounding the installation – the **Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ)** – within which arrangements to protect the public by introducing countermeasures are planned in detail.
- 10.1.2 The current DEPZ around the Site has been identified by ONR and this zone extends to a radius of 2.4 km and is shown in **Section 16.1**. This was determined when Hunterston A was operating and there were greater consequences from this site. Arrangements have been made for the implementation of early countermeasures in this Zone within a few hours of the declaration of the emergency. The 2017 Hunterston B Report of Assessment identifies that the limit of the REPPiR 5mSv effective dose is approximately 870m, therefore the urgent countermeasures pre-planned for the 2.4km DEPZ remains sufficient.
- 10.1.3 EDF will access the address database on Resilience Direct for the schedule for properties (both residential and businesses) within the DEPZ, identified within sectors can be made available to Police if required.

10.2 Criteria for the Introduction of Countermeasures During the Acute / Response Phase of an emergency

- 10.2.1 The criteria upon which the advice to introduce early countermeasures is based on the guidance presented to the Government by the PHE CRCE.

10.3 Acute / Response Phase Countermeasures, Radiological Hazard

- 10.3.1 EDF have identified the worst reasonably foreseeable accident in the Report of Assessment (March 2017) (at 4.8.3 of that report) and have later (at 4.13 of that report) determined the consequences and the downwind distances using the dispersion conditions as determined within REPPiR.
- 10.3.2 In the event of a reasonably foreseeable release of radioactive material from the site presenting a hazard to the public the following early countermeasures may be recommended:-

Sheltering	Residents in the affected area will be requested to stay indoors with doors and windows closed and ventilation systems turned off.
------------	--

Stable Iodine Tablets	Stable Iodine Tablets are pre-distributed to all households and premises in the DEPZ. The Telephone Warning system will include the message that they take these tablets in conjunction with either sheltering or evacuation.
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Redistribution will be decided by the STAC based on radiological conditions.

The pre-distributed Stable Iodine Tablets are securely packaged

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and are issued with a Government Advice Leaflet and an explanatory leaflet.

Stable Iodine Tablets are shelf life items and it is the responsibility of NHS Ayrshire and Arran to ensure that those pre-distributed are kept in date. Distribution will be carried out by NHS Ayrshire and Arran using the residents list maintained by EDF Energy – Nuclear Generation.

Evacuation The affected population can be evacuated in order to avoid (or potentially to avoid) relatively high short-term exposures.

For those people within the area who are not residents, eg, walkers, boat users, etc, information will be given using all means available, to take immediate shelter in an adequate building (brick built structure). If this is not possible, they will be directed to attend the Radiation Monitoring Unit, if established, for further reassurance.

Food and Water Control Controlling potentially contaminated food and water supplies will be achieved through the duties placed on the appropriate UK statutory bodies and the equivalent for the Scottish Government.

10.3.3 To avoid confusion in the first few hours, advice will take into account the difficulties, which may be experienced by the emergency organisations and the public if the recommendations on countermeasures are changed at short notice.

The advice on early countermeasures provided by EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation will be based on the Action Levels in the following: -

Early Countermeasure	Gamma Dose Rate (uSv/h)	Gross Beta Air Activity (Bq/m3)
None	<500	
Sheltering / Stable Iodine Tablets prophylaxis	501 - 5000	>10,000 - <100,000
Evacuation / Stable Iodine Tablets prophylaxis	>5000	> 100,000

10.3.4 Within a few hours there will be sufficient radiological measurements together with an isotopic analysis of the release to make a fuller assessment of the hazard to members of the public and the protective measures may be continued, extended or terminated in line with advice from the STAC. PHE CRCE would advise the STAC on the radiological aspects of the situation.

10.4 Acute / Response Countermeasures Implementation Plan

10.4.1 On receipt of the message alerting the police to an Off-site Nuclear Emergency, Police Scotland will:

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- Without delay, confirm with the site operator that the automated telephone alert system has been activated by the CESC, advising those residents within the DEPZ to take shelter and to tune into the local television or radio stations.
- Issue a holding statement to the media and / or social media.

10.4.2 Stable Iodine Tablets Issue

NHS Ayrshire and Arran have predistributed Stable Iodine Tablets to residents within the DEPZ. The Site Emergency Controller can authorise the immediate countermeasures of sheltering and taking Stable Iodine Tablets as agreed with NHS Ayrshire and Arran. These were distributed to all households in summer 2017.

In the event of a release affecting the residents within the DEPZ, communication arrangements utilising telephone messaging systems (residents are required to register with the Hunterston site to receive such telephone warnings) and television/radio announcements are in place to pass instructions to any affected residents to take the Stable Iodine Tablets already provided.

10.4.3 Evacuation

Any decision to evacuate sectors of the DEPZ will be based on the advice of the Site Emergency Controller, or the STAC as appropriate. They in turn will base their advice on the results of the mobile radiation monitoring teams (both on and off site), local weather conditions and estimates from the station operators of the scale and likely duration of the radioactive release.

10.4.4 Police Scotland will request the local authority to open a designated Rest Centre. See **Section 12** and further details are contained within the *Care for People Community Emergency Support Centre procedural documents*.

10.4.5 Police Scotland will be responsible for progressing any evacuation of DEPZ sectors that may be decided upon by those managing the response. Evacuation will be progressed in the manner most appropriate to the circumstances taking cognisance of Police Scotland intervention levels as per **Section 6.4.1**.

10.4.6 Police Scotland have no powers to compel people to leave their homes. In the event of occupants refusing to evacuate, they will be advised to shelter in their homes.

10.4.7 If the decision to evacuate one or more DEPZ sectors is taken, EDF Energy – Nuclear Generation will require the support of relevant organisations to:

- Contact each of the premises in the designated sector using the automated message warning system or such other measures as may be appropriate.
- Refer the residents to the emergency arrangements contained within the *Hunterston Power Stations Emergency Information for Local Residents Calendar*.
- Require the support of the HSCC/MBC to ensure suitable messages are broadcast to support any evacuation required.
- Explain the need for evacuation, transport arrangements and the location of the Rest Centre.

10.4.8 Police Scotland will keep a record of premises advised to evacuate, each household will complete the Registration Card attached to the *Hunterston Power Station Emergency*

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Information for Local Residents Calendar. On leaving the area this card should be passed to the police officer at the Police Access Control Point.

Police Scotland will also:

- Ascertain whether any transport is required and if so advise the Police Incident Control Point at Saltcoats, who will make the necessary arrangements through the local authority.
- Officers will liaise with the local authority in documenting all persons arriving at and leaving the centre.
- Request people being evacuated to check in at the Rest Centre, even if they intend to stay with relatives or friends out with the evacuated sectors.
- Obtain medical advice before effecting the removal of any person who is chronically ill, confined to bed or housebound.
- Set up Casualty Bureau if required.

10.4.9 To assist the police in identifying which properties within the DEPZ have been evacuated, residents are asked to hang a sheet within a front window of their property.

10.5 Later Countermeasures, Radiological Hazard

10.5.1 The collection of milk, locally grown foodstuffs and drinking water samples will commence so that the imposition of longer term countermeasures may be considered by the STAC and appropriate advice given to the SCG.

Where required the NHS will arrange further distribution of Stable Iodine Tablets, as appropriate, to other affected individuals when they have been evacuated to a Rest Centre. NHS Ayrshire and Arran may ask other Category 1 responders to assist with the actual distribution of Stable Iodine Tablets.

10.6 Public Information

10.6.1 Under the provisions specified in REPPiR (Regulations 16 and 17) the following categories of information must be provided to the public:

- Prior information. (*Hunterston Power Stations Emergency Information for Local Residents Calendar*)
- Information in the event of a Radiation Emergency.

10.6.2 More detailed information as specified in the Regulations regarding public information is contained in **Section 7**.

10.7 Population Overview

10.7.1 There are 40 houses within the DEPZ and a map of the sectors can be found at [REDACTED] to this plan.

Sector	House	Sector	House	Sector	House	Totals
A1	1	A2	1	A3	1	3
B1	0	B2	3	B3	1	4
C1	1	C2	2	C3	2	5
D1	0	D2	1	D3	2	3
E1	0	E2	2	E3	4	6
F1	0	F2	2	F3	4	6
G1	1	G2	0	G3	2	3

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H1	1	H2	1	H3	0	2
J1	3	J2	0	J3	0	3
K1	3	K2	0	K3	0	3
L1	1	L2	0	L3	0	1
M1	1	M2	0	M3	0	1
Totals	12		12		16	40

(Information provided from maps (Hunterston Rev. B – December 2016)

A full list of the properties is available from EDF via the address database on Resilience Direct

10.8 Settlements

10.8.1 There are no Settlements within the DEPZ.

10.9 Pets

10.9.1 Sheltering

When owners of pets are warned to take shelter and to take Stable Iodine Tablets they are to keep pets indoors or to place outdoor pets like rabbits and guinea pigs under cover.

10.9.2 Evacuation

When residents are required to evacuate they are advised to take their domestic pets with them to the Rest Centre, within a pet transporter such as a cage or basket. Once at the rest centre, the Council's Environmental Health Officer will take care of the animals as pets will not be accommodated within the Rest Centres unless they can. Further details are contained within the *Care for People Community Emergency Support Centre procedural documents*.

10.10 Livestock

10.10.1 For practical reasons farm livestock will have to remain in situ, unless it is possible for the farmer to get them undercover.

10.10.2 On evacuation to a Rest Centre the farmer should report to the Rest Centre Manager what the current situation is regarding his livestock.

10.11 Public Footpaths

10.11.1 The Ayrshire Coastal Path follows the Coastline and A78 Cycle Path through the DEPZ, and is regularly used by walkers. There is a gate at Portencross Castle on the southside which can be closed and it would be closed by Police on the northside.

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11 Outline Emergency Planning Zone Arrangements

11.1 The Outline Emergency Planning Zone

- 11.1.1 This Plan is supported by the *Civil Contingencies Act 2004*, *Civil Contingencies Planning (Scotland) Regulations 2005* and the guidance contained within Preparing Scotland issued in 2005 and has built in flexibility and extendibility in accordance with Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group guidance.
- 11.1.2 An Outline Emergency Planning Zone (OEPZ) around the Site has been identified by ONR. Arrangements have been made for the implementation of early countermeasures in this Zone as soon as possible following the declaration of an emergency. This Zone extends to a radius of 10km from the site and is shown in **Section 16.3**. The early countermeasures appropriate to this Zone are discussed in the following sections.
- 11.1.3 To facilitate an easier understanding of the data within the OEPZ the information is broken into 5 km bands around the site.
- 11.1.4 In order to meet the needs of the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), we are including information up to 20km extending the planning area beyond the OEPZ distance has been included.

11.2 Roles and Responsibilities and Mutual Aid

The roles and responsibilities of agencies shown in **Section 14** will continue to apply to the OEPZ and the extended planning area. The following are however applicable:

11.2.1 Mutual Aid

- The Emergency Organisation have arrangements with neighbouring organisations or organisational areas for the supply of additional personnel and equipment. Consideration will need to be given to the probable longer-term involvement, particularly in the later stages of recovery and clean-up, of some personnel in the NHS and Local Authorities and the need to support their departments with additional material and staff resources.
- The OEPZ and extended area covers land in North Ayrshire and Argyll and Bute Councils. A Memorandum of Understanding for mutual cooperation has been agreed between all thirteen Local Authorities in the West of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership area.
- Extendibility out to 40km for radiation monitoring of foodstuffs would involve the following Council areas: South Ayrshire, East Ayrshire, Inverclyde, East Renfrewshire, Renfrewshire, Dunbartonshire and Glasgow City Council.

11.3 Public Warning and Information

11.3.1 Emergency Information

- The public warning and information systems for an Off-site Nuclear Emergency would be as described in **Section 7**.
- Additional warning and public information media broadcasts on public safety countermeasures in sectors of the OEPZ would be carried out by the Police in conjunction with the other appropriate agencies.

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11.4 Acute / Response Countermeasures, Radiological Hazards

11.4.1 The procedures outlined in **Section 10** for the DEPZ will be extended to cover the OEPZ and the extended planning area.

11.5 Re-Supply of Stable Iodine Tablets

11.5.1 Should there be a requirement for Stable Iodine Tablets within the OEPZ and the extended planning area, NHS Ayrshire and Arran have stocks available and have procedures in place to access these stocks.

11.6 Radiation Monitoring

Agency	Responsibility to Monitor
EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation	Up to 40km from Hunterston
Food Standards Scotland	Food to determine levels of radioactive contamination within the food chain, including animal feed, in order to establish areas where food controls are required.
Public Health England	Coordinate available monitoring assets
Local Authorities (North Ayrshire and Argyll and Bute Councils)	Private water supplies and food in order to support FSS and to enforce any food safety controls.
Ministry of Defence	Provision of additional monitoring equipment
NHS Ayrshire and Arran	Monitoring of People
Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET)	Gathers Data from a network of gamma dose monitors across the UK and passes information to local authorities
Scottish Water	Public Water Supplies Wastewater Infrastructure including discharge points (in consultation with SEPA, etc)
SGRED	Animal welfare, farming and fishing
SEPA	Environmental Monitoring

11.7 Traffic and Access Control

- Although the main public safety countermeasures envisaged for implementation in the OEPZ are sheltering and stable Iodine tablets, prophylaxis, traffic flow from the area might become problematic if a large number of people decide to self-evacuate.
- The Police will identify suitable traffic control points ().
- Control points will also have to be identified at the outer edges of the OEPZ in order to regulate access to any areas where countermeasures have been implemented.

11.8 Information on Population and Local Infrastructure

- The current estimated population within the OEPZ, 10km of Hunterston is 34,419
- The current estimated population within the extended planning area out to 20km around Hunterston is 116,214.
- The estimated population numbers have been based on 2005 Small Area Population Estimates provided by General Register Office for Scotland. These estimates do not include any visitors / tourists who may be staying in the area and provides only a rough guide to the scale of operations necessary.

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- A number of isolated households and farms exist in the OEPZ and the area beyond the site. These may need special consideration in the event of public safety countermeasures being implemented.
- A number of schools, businesses and institutions are located within the OEPZ and the area beyond the site, which may require special consideration in the event of public safety countermeasures being implemented.

11.9 Rest Centres

11.9.1 In the event of countermeasures being implemented in the OEPZ, other suitable Rest Centre(s) will be identified and managed as per *Care for People Community Emergency Support Centre procedural documents*.

11.10 Population Overview

11.10.1 Population data extrapolated from the census and the register of electors. A map of the sectors can be found at **Section 16.3** to this plan.

Sector	Population	Sector	Population	Total
A4	0	A5	11,340	11,340
B4	1,434	B5	0	1,434
C4	0	C5	0	0
D4	0	D5	1,414	1,414
E4	2,870	E5	11,363	14,233
F4	1,913	F5	2,205	4,118
G4	141	G5	0	141
H4	0	H5	0	0
J4	0	J5	0	0
K4	0	K5	464	464
L4	637	L5	0	637
M4	638	M5	0	638
Total	7,633		26,786	34,419

Information from 2011 Census – usual resident population (ACCT - Population data for zones)

11.11 Settlements

11.11.1 The following settlements lie within the OEPZ.

Name	Sector	Zone	Grid Reference	Population
Millport	L/M	NW	NS171551	1275
Fairlie and Rural	B	NE	NS212545	1424
West Kilbride / Seamill	E / F	SE	NS203475	4951
Portencross	G	SW	NS175488	141
5 – 10 Km				
Largs	A	NE	NS201590	11340
Ardrossan	E/F	SE	NS233429	33071

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11.11.2 The following settlements are outwith the OEPZ but are within the extended planning area.

10 – 15 Km				
Kilbirnie	C	NE	NS315545	7642
Dalry	D	SE	NS295495	5964
Auchentiber	D	SE	NS363471	
Burnhouse	D	SE	NS384502	
Saltcoats	E / F	SE	NS245415	12717
Stevenston	E	SE	NS270420	9330
Kilwinning	E	SE	NS305430	16599
15 – 20 Km				
Barmill	C	NE	NS369515	6357
Beith	C	NE	NS349539	
Gateside	C	NE	NS363535	
Lochwinnoch	C	NE	NS355590	2880
Irvine	E	SE	NS325385	33698
Isle of Arran	J	SW	NS019455	3256
Skelmorlie	A	NE	NS193675	2095
Rothsay Isle of Bute	L	NW	NS088648	4637
Wemyss Bay	A	NE	NS195705	2592

Information provided from 2011 Census – usual resident population

11.12 Emergency Centres

11.12.1 The following emergency centres are found within the OEPZ

Name	Sector	Zone	Grid Reference
West Kilbride Community Centre	E4	SE	NS203483
5 – 10 Km			
Vikingar Largs	A5	N	NS202600

11.12.2 The following emergency centres are outwith the OEPZ but are within the extended planning area.

10 – 15 Km			
Kilbirnie, Bridgend Community Centre	C6	E	NS317547
Dalry, Community Centre	D6	E	NS288491
Ardrossan, Civic Centre, Glasgow Street	E6	SE	NS231424
Stevenston, Ardeer Neighbourhood Centre, Shore Road	E6	SE	NS268411
Kilwinning, Nethermains Centre	E6	SE	NS303426
15 – 20 Km			
Skelmorlie, Community Centre	A7	N	NS195680
Beith Community Centre, Kings Road	C7	E	NS348541
Irvine, Castlepark Community Centre	E7	SE	NS321406

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11.16.2 The following Camping and caravan sites are found outwith the OEPZ but are within the extended planning area.

Name	Sector	Zone	Grid Reference
10-20km			
Largs Yacht Haven, Irvine Road, Largs	A5	NE	NS207572
Glenboyd Hotel, Seamill, West Kilbride	??	??	??
Waterside Hotel, Seamill, West Kilbride	F5	SE	NS206461
Loup Cottage Caravan Site, North Shore, Ardrossan	F5	SE	
Glenview Caravan Site, Northshore, Ardrossan	F5	SE	
Millglen Caravan Park, Dalry Road, Ardrossan	E5	NE	NS233446
Sandylands Holiday Park, James Miller Crescent, Saltcoats	E6	SE	NS263412
Easter Highfield, Dalry	D6	SE	NS314503
Craigend Farm Dalry	D6	SE	NS285483
Burnhouse Caravan Park, Burnhouse, Beith	C7	NE	NS382502
Viewfield Manor Leisure Park, Lochlibo Road (A736), Torranyard, Kilwinning. KA13 7RD	D7	SE	NS358439
Annick Caravan Park, Perceton	D7	SE	?????
Cunninghamhead Caravan Park	D7	SE	NS367418
Greenacres, Dubbs Road, Stevenston, KA20 3DD	E7	SE	NS279420
Lylestone Caravan Park, by Kilwinning	D6	SE	NS328453

*(The above list was provided on 13 March 2019 and a current list, if required, is available from NAC Licencing)
(Information was also provided by Argyll and Bute indicating no caravan parks in extended area - ACCT)
(Information was also provided by Inverclyde Council 12 July 2017)*

11.17 Railway Stations

11.17.1 The following Railway Stations are found within the OEPZ.

Name	Sector	Zone	Grid Reference
Fairlie Railway Station	B	NE	NS210546
5 – 10 Km			
Largs Railway Station	A	NE	NS203592
West Kilbride Railway Station	E	NE	NS208484

11.17.2 The following Railway Stations are outwith the OEPZ but are within the extended planning area.

Name	Sector	Zone	Grid Reference
10 – 15 Km			
Glengarnock Railway Station	C5	NE	NS321528
Dalry Railway Station	D5	NE	NS298491
Ardrossan South Beach Railway Station	F6	SE	NS237422
Ardrossan Town Railway Station	F6	SE	NS230420
Ardrossan Harbour Railway Station	F6	SE	NS225421
Saltcoats Railway Station	E6	SE	NS249412
Kilwinning Railway Station	E6	SE	NS296436
Stevenston Railway Station	E6	SE	NS270412
15 – 20 Km			
Wemyss Bay Railway Station	A7	NE	NS193685
Lochwinnoch Railway Station	C7	NE	NS360579
Irvine Railway Station	E7	SE	NS316384



11.22 Reservoirs and Water Treatment Works

11.22.1

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12 Rest Centre Management

12.1 General Information

12.1.1 North Ayrshire Health and Social Care Partnership have a set of *Care for People Community Emergency Support Centre Guidelines* which include Emergency Centre Procedures. These should be used in conjunction with the following information to ensure an effective response.

A Rest Centre is a safe and secure place for the temporary accommodation of people affected by the emergency. It may be opened for a short or prolonged period depending on the circumstances and this may involve overnight facilities in the short term.

It is also a place where information can be collated, and through the registration process, assist the authorities to identify future requirements. Additionally it is a source of information for the Casualty Bureau, which may be established by Police Scotland in one of their premises.

12.1.2 Casualty Bureau is a system used by Police Scotland to collate information on persons possibly involved in major emergencies by recording specific details of victims at the scene, at hospitals and at any Rest Centre(s). Should the Police initiate the Casualty Bureau, it is vital that the Casualty Bureau Form is completed in addition to the information required by the Local Authority during the registration process.

12.1.3 It is normally the SCG who recommend whether or not to evacuate and define the area to be evacuated. Their recommendation will take account of advice from the STAC and other relevant individuals and other organisations.

12.1.4 The two designated Rest Centre(s) for members of the public within the DEPZ affected by an incident at the Hunterston Site are Vikingar in Largs and West Kilbride Community Centre.

12.1.5 There is a slight possibility that some of those arriving at the Rest Centre(s) could have their outer clothing and exposed body parts contaminated due to passing through a radioactive plume.

12.1.6 Evacuees will be required to attend a Reassurance Monitoring Unit prior to entering a Rest Centre. A Reassuring Monitoring Unit will determine if an individual has been exposed to or contaminated by a radiological substance. During the reassurance monitoring process, if an individual is found to have external contamination they will be decontaminated using established national guidelines. If the individual is found to have internal contamination they will be referred to specialist NHS facilities. Reassurance monitoring will be arranged by NHS Ayrshire and Arran with support from other agencies.

12.1.7 After further monitoring, and if found free from contamination, evacuees should make their way as directed to the registration area in the Rest Centre(s) to allow the necessary documentation to take place.

12.1.8 If considered necessary, Stable Iodine Tablets may be dispensed at the Rest Centre(s) by staff from NHS Ayrshire and Arran.

12.1.9 Should additional premises be required, a full list of available Rest Centre(s) is available through the *Care for People Community Emergency Support Centre procedural documents*.

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12.1.10 Where transport for the movement of people affected by the incident this resource should be sought through the Council Emergency Control Centre.

12.2 Rest Centre(s) Information

12.2.1 Primary Rest Centre facilities are located at :-

Vikingar

Greenock Road

LARGS

KA30 8QL

Map reference – NS 202600

West Kilbride Community Centre

15 Corse Street

WEST KILBRIDE

KA23 9AX

Map reference – NS 203483

12.2.2 In the event that the emergency services requires local authority assistance to open the Rest Centre(s), contact will be made via the ACCT. (See **Section 17.1**).

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13 Recovery Protocols

13.1 Introduction

- 13.1.1 The general principles of nuclear emergency response planning for intervention following nuclear incidents should apply equally to the recovery phase.
- 13.1.2 It is incumbent on all agencies involved in the development of the Off-site Plan to consider the impact of both on-site and off-site incidents upon the staff, public and environment in and around the Hunterston complex. The foremost concerns are for the safety of personnel and the public, containment of any radiological or chemical release and the return of any and all affected areas, as far as realistically possible, to normal use.
- 13.1.3 A recovery strategy reflects a pattern of decisions that set the long term direction of the overall recovery process and determines its success.
- 13.1.4 It is proposed that planning for recovery following an incident should be supported by a Recovery Working Group (RWG), which would be established as soon as practicable after it became clear that off-site contamination was going to occur. The RWG would support the work of the Strategic Coordination Group, on which a number of organisations would be represented including the Government Liaison Officer (GLO). The RWG would draw on international and national guidance concerning intervention following nuclear incidents in undertaking its work.
- 13.1.5 A study undertaken for NEPLG has shown that, even for a UK nuclear reactor incident irrespective of the reference incident, the amount of decontamination and restricted access measures to safeguard the public from direct radiation exposure is likely to be limited.
- 13.1.6 Some decontamination might be considered desirable to minimise short-term exposures, but in this case, relocation of the population for a few days, to allow decay of short-lived material, is also an option.
- 13.1.7 Widespread decontamination is only likely to arise for incidents well in excess of the reasonably foreseeable release. The chances of this occurring are extremely remote. However, the study also showed that a reference incident could have an impact on local agricultural produce. In such circumstances, European Union maximum permitted levels for radionuclides in foodstuffs are likely to be exceeded out to a distance of about 25km from the site. This would require statutory interdiction by the FSS in order to prevent contaminated foodstuffs entering public supply and which would need to be managed as a waste.

13.2 Management Framework

- 13.2.1 International experience, has demonstrated that the long term management and rehabilitation of contaminated territories is not a narrow radiological issue that can be dealt with largely or solely by technical means. Rather it is a broader issue of governance which must address all affected dimensions e.g. health, environmental, economic, social, cultural, ethical, political etc.
- 13.2.2 There is a need at the outset of an emergency event to develop policy and broadly applicable arrangements for the long term management and rehabilitation of potentially contaminated areas.
- 13.2.3 Such policies should establish a coherent framework for the sustainable rehabilitation of living conditions in areas with long term contamination. It should provide a way of integrating and

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coordinating an approach involving all stakeholders and dimensions. This involves direct involvement of the public and local professionals.

13.3 Key Issues

13.3.1 The RWG will need to initiate and develop mechanisms and protocols to swiftly access and assimilate key data, so that they can provide a practical recovery strategy for the Strategic Coordination Group.

13.3.2 Key issues, requiring resolution may include the following:-

- What is the level of contamination, extent, nuclide composition?
- How effective are countermeasures at removing radioactivity or reducing doses?
- What are the doses with and without the countermeasures?
- What are the doses to the people implementing the countermeasures?
- What are the resource, time and cost implications?
- Are there important issues related to the timing of the incident?
- Are there important issues related to other aspects, e.g. to the environmental, economic, social, cultural, ethical, political etc. dimensions?

13.4 Radiological protection principles in Intervention tactics

13.4.1 The fundamental principles applying to any recovery activities necessary as a result of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency should follow the international principles applying to “intervention” following nuclear emergencies as drawn up by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and recommended for use by PHE.

13.4.2 PHE set out three categories of recovery and effectiveness and the possible countermeasures required, which are reproduced in the table below:

Option	Description	Likely example
A	Moderately dose-effective, relatively low disruption / resource requirement, prompt implementation, completed within about one month	Ploughing large areas of grass Extended evacuation / short term relocation (short-lived radionuclides) Vacuum sweeping / high pressure washing all metallised surfaces Grass cutting
B	Dose-effective, relatively high disruption / resource requirement, long duration / lasting impact	Turf / soil removal and replacement Double digging of all soil / grass areas Road planning Prolonged or permanent relocation
C	Either: poorly dose-effective or moderately dose effective, but high disruption / resource requirement,	High pressure washing buildings Sandblasting walls Roof replacement Cleaning indoor surfaces

13.4.3 While implementing these recovery options, it is important, as it is for urgent response countermeasures, to balance the benefit of implementing the options against the disadvantages. The PHE recommend a table of the circumstances in which the options should be considered and is based on the magnitude of the event – this is similar in application to the interpretation of the ERLs used for urgent countermeasures (see table below).

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Circumstance	Recovery Options	
	To consider	Unlikely to be justified
Any off site contamination	Category A	Category B Category C
Dose > 10mSv/year	Category A Category B	Category C
Lifetime Dose > 1Sv	All	None

13.4.4 The PHE –CRCE representative on the RWG will provide detailed advice and guidance on the justification of recovery options. However, it is important to match the level of disruption and resource which would arise against the expected benefits of the strategy selected in terms of averted dose. In particular, strategies involving major disruption and / or resources should not be considered effective for averted doses that are less than 10mSv in the first year following a nuclear emergency.

13.5 Disposal of Radioactive Waste Solids and Foodstuffs

13.5.1 The Food Standards Scotland will provide up to date risk assessment advice to determine if food is fit for human consumption. In the event that food is not fit for human consumption, disposal of radioactive waste will take place in accordance with Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) (who implements the requirements of the *Radioactive Substances Act) Guidelines*.

13.5.2 In the context of an Off–site Nuclear Emergency, milk is an important foodstuff because it is produced continually in large quantities. However, the availability of both practical advice and policy level guidance on the management of contaminated milk is limited.

13.5.3 Both the FSS and SEPA are able to advise the SCG on the area and consequences arising from potential Food and Environmental Protection Act (FEPA) orders.

13.6 Nuclear Claims Liability

13.6.1 Claims against operators of Nuclear Installations made under the *Nuclear Installation Act 1965 as amended* (NIA65) are insured up to the statutory limit of operator liability, namely £140M per event per site. The Government and international convention signatories are liable for death, injury and property damage in excess of the Act limit.

13.6.2 Contingency planning arrangements have been developed to deal with claims flowing from a nuclear incident that causes injury to any person or damage to any property of any person other than the licence holder.

13.6.3 The operator is responsible for incorporating site specific planning into its emergency management arrangements and invoking the plan. The purpose of the plan is to provide an effective mechanism to deal with the potentially high volumes of claims that may arise immediately following an Off-site Nuclear Emergency and thereafter to process claims from third parties made against the Operator in compliance with good business practice, insurance policy terms and conditions and legal codes.

13.6.4 Upon confirmation from the operator that a release of nuclear material from site has occurred, issue an agreed press statement identifying contact details for the submission of claim notifications i.e. Operators website address with link to the claims site and contact telephone numbers.

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13.7 Monitoring, Decontamination and Restricted Access Measures

- 13.7.1 The monitoring of radioactivity present in the environment as a result of a radiation emergency will continue throughout the recovery phase coordinated by the RWG.
- 13.7.2 For minor contamination resulting from relatively small incidents, the recovery work may be delegated in its entirety to the site working on the basis of advice from the STAC.
- 13.7.3 For more serious contamination resulting from larger incidents the responsibility for management of the recovery responsibilities should be carried out directly from the HSCC under North Ayrshire Council control (assuming that by this time the Council has taken over from the police). The Council will draw upon the site expertise and resources as appropriate.
- 13.7.4 In the unlikely event of an Off-site Nuclear Emergency leading to a significant spread of radioactivity in the environment, key considerations for environmental monitoring are:
- The PHE CRCE will be responsible for the coordination of the monitoring programme and take the lead in the interpretation of the results however, individual organisations will remain responsible for the management and safety of their equipment and personnel.
 - Supporting additional monitoring units from the UK Nuclear Industry will be used to provide comprehensive coverage (operator's other sites, other operators, MOD, etc).
 - RIMNET will be used as the agreed channel to bring together monitoring results, and managed by DEFRA.

13.8 Radioactive Waste Disposal

- 13.8.1 Scottish Environment Protection Agency Role:
SEPA can advise on the management and disposal of wastes contaminated with radioactive activity and advise DEFRA on the regulatory matters relating to the management and disposal of radioactive wastes.
- 13.8.2 Food Standards Scotland Role:
The FSS can also advise on the disposal of contaminated foodstuffs. In the event of a significant beyond design basis accident, the FSS would propose an appropriate disposal strategy. This strategy would be finalised in conjunction with the food and farming industries, interested government departments and other response agencies, the speed of such decisions would be based on their needs.

13.9 Reference / Guidance Materials

- 13.9.1 The North Ayrshire Council Civil Contingencies Response and Recovery Plan details generic recovery arrangements that will be used during any major emergency within North Ayrshire. All stakeholders involved in progressing a recovery strategy should take cognisance of the reference and guidance material contained within the following documentation.
- National Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guidance
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-nuclear-emergency-planning-and-response-guidance>
 - UK Recovery Handbook for Radiation Incidents 2015 issued by PHE CRCE.
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-recovery-handbooks-for-radiation-incident-2015>

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13.9.2 These documents provide both legislative and radiological information, data sheets, decision trees etc on a multiplicity of recovery issues. A brief synopsis of factors identified in the above literature contains the following topics:

- General information
 - Framework for developing a recovery strategy
 - Scenarios
 - Radionuclides
 - Radiation Protection Principles
 - Radiation Protection Principles and criteria
 - Health effects
 - Types of radiation hazard
 - Recovery phase systems

- Agricultural food production
 - Radiation protection criteria for agricultural food production
 - Agricultural food production systems
 - Agricultural Countermeasures
 - Waste disposal options
 - Management options

- Domestic food production
 - Radiation protection criteria for domestic food production
 - Domestic food production systems
 - Countermeasures for use in gardens, allotments and from the wild
 - Waste disposal options
 - Management options

- Inhabited areas
 - Recovery criteria in inhabited areas
 - Nature, extent and character of contamination
 - Estimating doses in inhabited areas
 - Considering appropriate recovery options
 - Assess consequences of implementing recovery options
 - Choice to do 'no clean up'
 - Clean up while people are in situ
 - Protection of workers
 - Management of contaminated waste
 - Comparison of options

- Drinking water
 - Drinking water supplies
 - Monitoring of supplies
 - Recovery options
 - Estimating doses and activity concentration

- Waste water
 - Potential impacts on sewage system
 - Estimating the nature of potential radiation discharges to sewer
 - Monitoring of sludge contamination in waste water systems

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14 Roles, Responsibilities and Agreed Actions of Participating Agencies

14.1 General

14.1.1 This section details the agreed roles, responsibilities and actions of those agencies expected to respond to a Site Incident and an Off-site Nuclear Emergency at Hunterston “B” Nuclear Power Station. It is for each responding agency to ensure that it has adequate internal plans and resources to meet commitments under this Plan.

14.2 Health and Safety

14.2.1 Agencies who undertake, as part of this plan, to enter either the station premises or any adjacent area which may be affected by a release of radiation are responsible for the health and safety of their employees. In particular, they must as part of their own planning process:

- Agree with the Site Emergency Controller EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation on the dose levels for both on-site and off-site mitigating action.
- Ensure that any staff who may be required to enter the affected area are properly equipped, trained and briefed.

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14.3 Office for Nuclear Regulation

14.3.1 The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is responsible for regulating nuclear and conventional safety for the UK nuclear facilities. In the event of an emergency; ONR is responsible for monitoring the activities of the operators, Local Authority and responding agencies and keeping the central Government and devolved administrations fully informed on all matters related to the response.

Using its statutory powers, ONR will inspect and review the activities of the operator to ensure that they are taking all responsible steps both to restore the plant to a safe state and to minimize the risk to the general public.

14.3.2 Actions

On being notified of a site incident or off-site emergency, ONR will:

- Send inspectors to the affected site's emergency facilities and to the appropriate off-site facility (SCC) who will monitor the situation and the steps taken to restore control and provide advice through the STAC.
- Send inspectors to the operators Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC) at Barnwood Gloucester.
- Set up its own Incident Suite at Redgrave Court, Bootle, to provide a technical assessment capability and to support the Chief Nuclear Inspector and the ONR inspectors on the site, at the off-site facility or at the CESC.
- Make independent assessments of the likely course of the accident, its consequences and consider any implications for other nuclear installations.
- Deploy the Chief Nuclear Inspector to the NEBR or SGoRR. The Chief Nuclear Inspector will act as an advisor to central Government in nuclear emergencies and will give advice based on ONR's assessments to Government departments, devolved administration, HSE, and the operators as appropriate.

The ONR is responsible for ensuring that nuclear operators, Local Authority and responding agencies make adequate arrangements to respond to a nuclear emergency.

As the licensing authority for Civil Nuclear Installations, the ONR will be informed of a 'site incident' or an 'Off-site Nuclear Emergency' occurring at Hunterston B Power Station. In the event of such a declaration, the ONR is responsible for:

- Establishing the ONR Incident Suite at Redgrave Court, Bootle, Merseyside to provide an assessment facility and deployed ONR Inspectors
- Sending ONR Inspectors to the affected site (and other locations as required) in connection with the responsibilities detailed below
- Investigating the circumstances of the incident, monitoring events on the affected site and satisfying itself that the appropriate actions are being taken by the site licensee to restore the plant to a safe condition
- Considering implications for safety at other nuclear sites
- Advising Central Government Departments on the likely course of the accident, its consequences and the implications for other nuclear installations
- Advising the ONR Inspectors at the SCC on the likely course of the accidents and its consequences
- Investigating the circumstances of the event, if it considered that a breach of health and safety legislation may have occurred.

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14.4 EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation

14.4.1 Roles and Responsibilities

In the event of an Off-site Nuclear Emergency at Hunterston “B” Nuclear Power Station, EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation will provide advice on any early countermeasures necessary to protect the public until such times as the STAC assumes this responsibility at the HSCC. Further to this provision, EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation will provide radiological survey information including the results of the analysis of air samples out to 40km from the Site in accordance with the Site Emergency Plan. The Company also has a responsibility to inform the Food Standards Agency of any release who in turn will notify Food Standards Scotland. EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation will remain responsible at all times for activities on Hunterston “B” Site.

At the HSCC, the Company Technical Adviser (CTA) will be the formal EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation source of advice to the Police and other agencies. When the responsibility for providing advice has passed to the STAC, the CTA will provide support and advice to the STAC.

14.4.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

On declaration of a Site Incident at Hunterston “B”, the operator will: -

1. Notify the relevant agencies, see **Section 1** (Site Incident).
2. Establish the ECC on Site under the direction of a Site Emergency Controller.
3. Deploy Site Emergency Teams to mitigate effects.
4. Deploy Off-site Survey Teams to monitor off-site conditions.
5. Establish the CESC.
6. Establish a Media interface.

Off-site Nuclear Emergency

On declaration of an Off-site Nuclear Emergency at Hunterston “B”, the operator will:

1. Notify the relevant agencies, see **Section 1** (Off-site Nuclear Emergency).
2. Establish the ECC on Site under the direction of the Site Emergency Controller.
3. Deploy Site Emergency Teams to mitigate effects.
4. Deploy Off-site Survey Teams to monitor off-site conditions.
5. Provide advice from the CESC to participating agencies on the need or otherwise for early countermeasures until such times as responsibility for this function is accepted by the STAC.
6. Inform Police Scotland that residents and businesses within the DEPZ have been notified
7. Provide emergency services with dosimeters at the ACP
8. Deploy emergency staff at the HSCC to provide facilities and support functions associated with these facilities.
9. Provide information to agencies attending the HSCC and support the integrated management approach under the coordination of the Strategic Coordinator.
10. Establish a Media Interface and support the coordinated approach in the Media Briefing Centre.

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14.5 British Telecom (BT)

14.5.1 Roles and Responsibilities

Site Incident

No action.

Off-site Nuclear Emergency

On receipt of a call to the BT National Emergency Linkline number (See **Section 17.1** for contact telephone number):

- BT may assist with advice on communications issues and possible options to the Category 1 and 2 incident commanders, and other members of the Strategic Coordinating Group prior to or during an incident.
- BT may engage with Scottish Government Offices and Devolved Administrations in planning for and responding to major incidents.
- Assist Category 1 and 2 responders to maintain their services during incidents.
- Assist Category 1 and 2 responders so they may in turn help BT to maintain services.
- BT may provide an emergency response, including restoration of essential services where infrastructure damage has occurred. BT also engages between the telecommunications industry on matters of mutual interest.

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14.6 British Transport Police

14.6.1 Roles and Responsibilities

The railways are a unique policing environment with a unique set of needs. The British Transport Police is the national police force for the railways providing a policing service to rail operators, their staff and passengers throughout England, Scotland and Wales.

Under the Civil contingencies Act 2004 British Transport Police is one of three national Category 1 Responders with responsibility across the United Kingdom. Consequently the scope of the organisation under the Act is reserved to the UK Government.

Any incident on or effecting the Railway Infrastructure within Scotland will involve at least two police forces (BTP and Police Scotland). It is important that the division of responsibility between the two forces is clear, to ensure that there is no interference to the prime function of rescue and treatment of casualties, or cause the duplication of scarce police resources.

14.6.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

No action.

Off-site Nuclear Emergency

- Responsible for the liaison with Network Rail and the Train Operating companies to ensure that any necessary closure of the line is put in place;
- Link into the Hunterston Off Site Centre and with the appointed RIO to ensure the safety of the travelling public.

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14.7 Food Standards Scotland

14.7.1 Roles and Responsibilities

The Food Standards Agency (FSA) is responsible for food safety in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Food Standards Scotland (FSS), which was established on 1 April 2015, is responsible for food safety in Scotland. FSS's role is to help protect the public from risks to health which may arise through the consumption of food.

In the event of a radiological emergency in the UK (including those in or affecting Scotland), the food safety incident response will be led by the FSA unless it is mutually agreed that FSS will take over the lead. FSS will provide the on-site response in Scotland. FSA and FSS will collaborate closely, maintain compatible incident management plans and ensure effective communication throughout the emergency.

In the event of an emergency the FSS will lead the Scottish Government's response on food safety issues, assess the impact of the emergency on the food chain and implement any necessary countermeasures.

Specific responsibilities are:

- To liaise with relevant partners to determine the level of any contamination in the food chain;
- To take action to ensure that food which exceeds maximum permitted levels does not enter the food chain;
- To liaise with relevant partners, as necessary, to implement restriction orders under the Food and Environment protection Act 1985 to restrict the supply, movement or sale of produce from the affected area.
- To provide support, advice, information and guidance to local authorities, businesses and the public on the implications for food;
- To provide support and advice to the Scottish Government and partners dealing with the emergency;
- To ensure that subsequent recovery arrangements take account of food safety issues

14.7.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

No action

Off-site Nuclear Emergency

On receipt of advice of an Off-site Nuclear Emergency the FSA will carry out a rapid assessment of the emergency's potential impact on food safety, using whatever information is available. FSA will notify FSS of the release and FSS will:

- Attend the Hunterston Off-site Strategic Coordinating Centre (HSCC), as appropriate;
- Provide scientific advice relating to food via the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC);
- Provide the precautionary advice area in which relevant Maximum permitted levels in food and feed might be exceeded, as determined by the Food Standards Agency. The areas affected by this precautionary advice can often be much larger than those areas where immediate countermeasures, such as sheltering, have been implemented;
- If it is assessed that levels of radioactivity in any potential food and feed produced may exceed Maximum permitted levels, Food Standards Scotland will liaise with Scottish Government Rural Inspections Directorate (SGRPID) and the local authority to gather

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relevant information on the local area (eg, the type of extent of regional agricultural practices);

- Liaise with local authorities to take action to ensure that food contaminated to unacceptable levels does not enter the food chain;
- Liaise with relevant partners, as necessary, to implement restriction orders under the Food & Environment Act 1985 (FEPA) to restrict the supply, movement or sale of produce from the affected area;
- Liaise with the Media Briefing Cell and prepare press releases to provide advice to the public, businesses and stakeholders regarding any implications for food.

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14.8 DEFRA CBRN Emergencies

14.8.1 Roles and Responsibilities

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) CBRN Emergencies is concerned with the recovery of the open and built environment following a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) or major hazardous materials (HazMat) incident.

CBRN Emergencies' primary functions are -

- To provide advice, guidance and assistance on decontamination related issues to responsible authorities in their contingency planning for, and response to, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) and major HazMat incidents
 - CBRN –a deliberate act involving Chemical, Biological, Radioactive or Nuclear materials.
 - Major HAZMAT – an accident, regardless of scale, involving Chemical, Biological, Radioactive or Nuclear materials where the incident is in excess of local capability and/or knowledge and authorities request CBRN Emergencies' framework services.
- To maintain and build on the CBRN Emergencies' framework of specialist suppliers and ensure that responsible authorities have access to these services if the need arises
- To advise central Government on the national capability for the decontamination of buildings, infrastructure, transport and open environment, and be a source of expertise in the event of a CBRN incident or major release of HazMat materials

Contact details are available at **Section 17**

CBRN Emergencies operational capability includes -

- Facilitate the rapid decontamination of CBRN releases using private-sector capability
- On call 24/7 to provide access to CBRN Emergencies expertise and Framework services
- Provide expert scientific and technical advice to relevant groups, including Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) and Recovery Coordination Group (RCG), on the most appropriate decontamination methods

CBRN Emergencies' also produces the Strategic National Guidance: The decontamination of buildings, infrastructure and the open environment exposed to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/strategic-national-guidance-the-decontamination-of-buildings-infrastructure-and-open-environment-exposed-to-chemical-biological-radiological-or-nuclear-materials>

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14.8.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

No action

Off-site Nuclear Emergency

- Provide an early presence at the HSCC or equivalent, to provide direct advice on the potential impact of decisions made during the incident response phase on short, medium and longer term decontamination approaches;
- Establish liaison with specialist suppliers to prepare for possible deployment for decontamination of the above;
- Provide advice and guidance to a STAC / RWG at the HSCC or equivalent, in the development of a decontamination strategy as part of an over-arching recovery strategy;
- Work with specialist agencies (e.g. specialist police and military resources) on specific aspects of decontamination as they might impact positively or adversely on their operations;
- Work with other Government agencies (e.g. SEPA, PHE CRCE, FSA) to develop joint strategies to deal with the consequences of a radiological event upon the environment;
- Work with responders to identify, address and resolve operational issues arising from the possible deployment of specialist suppliers to undertake decontamination following a nuclear event;
- Provide guidance and advice to a STAC / RWG during delivery of a decontamination strategy;
- Participate in the development of decontamination priorities at Local, Regional and National levels.

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14.9 HM Coastguard

14.9.1 Roles and Responsibilities

HM Coastguard (HMCG) is the Search and Rescue branch of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). HMCG has a statutory duty under the *Coastguard Act 1925*, by order of the Secretary of State for Transport, as amended by Statutory Instrument, for the initiation and coordination of civil maritime and some inland Search and Rescue within the United Kingdom Search and Rescue Region.

This includes the mobilisation, organisation and tasking of adequate resources to respond to persons either in distress at sea, or to persons at risk of injury or death on cliffs or shoreline of United Kingdom.

HMCG has the responsibility of broadcasting marine safety information, including navigation warnings, weather, subfacts and gunfacts information on Very High Frequency and Medium Frequency. HMCG Coastguard Operations Centre Belfast will use scheduled and non-scheduled radio broadcasts to give alerts to commercial shipping, fishing vessels, yachts and other pleasure craft on Radio and Satellite Systems.

- HMCG Search and Rescue Teams are equipped with 4x4 vehicles, lighting, rope, water and mud rescue equipment and VHF Radio Communications.
- HMCG teams are able to communicate with rescue vessels at sea, Search and Rescue helicopters, Police/ Air ambulance units and fixed wing search and rescue aircraft. They are also able to set up and man, local helicopter landing sites.
- For non-coastal incidents, HMCG Rescue Teams will carry out duties delegated to them in support of the other Emergency Services.

14.9.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

No action.

Off-site Nuclear Emergency

- CGOC Belfast will open an incident in their Command and Control System, and establish and maintain communications with the HSCC and Police Scotland Service Overview.
- CGOC Belfast will dispatch personnel to attend at the HSCC and, if required, an Incident Officer to the Police Forward Control Post.
- HMCG will initiate alert broadcasts on Radio and Satellite Systems at the request of Police Scotland / HSCC Liaison Officer.
- HMCG will conduct enquiries to establish the safety of vessels or persons, which may be in potential danger areas, in consultation with the Police / HSCC Liaison Officer.
- HMCG may task Coastguard units to assist the other emergency services, and will respond to any other requests through the HSCC Liaison Officer.

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14.10 Met Office

14.10.1 Roles and Responsibilities

The Met Office is responsible for providing weather and plume dispersal information as part of Procedures and Communications in the event of a Release of Radioactive Material (PACRAM).

14.10.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

The Met Office will provide the emergency organisations with meteorological forecasts, advice and specialist services in the event of any non-malicious CBRN release into the atmosphere. Advice can be provided either by Met Office Exeter or the Civil Contingencies Advisors.

Off-site Nuclear Emergency

- The Met Office will provide the emergency authorities with meteorological forecasts, advice and specialist services in the event of any non-malicious nuclear release into the atmosphere.
- Met Office EMARC (Environmental Monitoring and Response Centre) Forecasters will respond to an emergency, by providing an immediate verbal assessment of the wind direction and an estimate of the likely plume characteristics.
- The forecaster will then provide a more detailed written forecast (PACRAM forecast form B) together with an area at risk map of the area. This should be available to the requestor within 20 minutes of the request. It will be sent via fax and/or email (as required). Note that all PACRAM forecasts are also emailed to Barnwood, Food Standards Scotland (FSS) and RIMNET for info. Should other Government agencies make enquiries of the Met Office in relation to the incident (e.g. Police, Local Authority), then the same PACRAM information will be forwarded to that agency.
- The forecaster will issue PACRAM with updates as appropriate or as requested, e.g. possible changes in wind direction, and/or respond to requests for further information as required.
- Note that, if requested by the emergency services, a Met Office Civil Contingency Advisor can attend the HSCC to provide direct liaison between the Incident Commanders and forecasters at the Met Office HQ.

The role of an Advisor during an incident is:-

1. To ensure that the management teams are aware of all the meteorological factors which could impact on the incident.
2. To ensure consistency of information, and that all responders within are able to utilise this information.
3. Where required to interpret this information for the responders.
4. To source other scientific advice available from the Met Office (e.g. from dispersion scientists) and to act as a point of contact between the Met Office and responders. This will free up responders resources to enable them to utilise their specific skills effectively.
5. Respond to weather related enquiries.

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6. If required and appropriate, to arrange for routine forecasts and other information to be supplied in the recovery phase.
7. To assist in the audit trail by documenting all meteorological requests and responses.

Information on any plume, including all PACRAM forecasts, can be uploaded on to the Met Office Hazard Manager website so that all information is available to all responders. Hazard Manager is available to all Cat 1 and Cat 2 responders at all times.

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14.11 Neighbouring Councils

14.11.1 General

East Ayrshire, South Ayrshire, Inverclyde, Argyll and Bute, Renfrewshire border North Ayrshire Council. East Renfrewshire, East and West Dunbartonshire and the City of Glasgow are all within a 40Km radius of the Hunterston Power Station.

It may be required that information is passed onto these authorities to enable them to carry out appropriate monitoring should any incident dictate.

14.11.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

No Notification or action

Off-site Nuclear Emergency

On receipt of notification consider implementation of REPPiR procedures / arrangements.

- Possible request for mutual aid
- Possible request to monitor out to 40km.
- Possible request to monitor beyond 40km

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14.12 Network Rail in Scotland

14.12.1 Roles and Responsibilities

Network Rail is the owner and operator of the railway infrastructure in the UK. All train operations are controlled by them although services are provided by Train Operating Companies and Freight Operating Companies.

The Scottish Route of Network Rail is controlled from its Control Room in Glasgow and it is from here that any emergency response will be initiated and coordinated. On-call staff are strategically located throughout the region, available to respond to incidents around the clock. It is Network Rail who manages any incident affecting the railway on behalf of the railway industry.

In the event of an Off-site Nuclear Emergency being declared in respect of the Hunterston Site, Network Rail will assume this role by appointing a Rail Incident Officer (RIO) who will attend [REDACTED]

The RIO will liaise with other railway agencies as may be required, in respect of the suspension of rail transport on the Largs branch and on any other affected routes. The RIO will also facilitate any request to use rail services for evacuation or other emergency purposes.

14.12.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

No action.

Off-site Nuclear Emergency

On receipt of advice of an Off-site Nuclear Emergency at Hunterston "B" Nuclear Power Station from the Police, Network Rail Control will activate the relevant section of the Network Rail Emergency Plan. This involves alerting a designated individual who will assume the role of RIO. The RIO will proceed to the HSCC and may be accompanied by an assistant who will provide administrative assistance at the HSCC. Network Rail may also elect to nominate a senior officer to act as Rail Incident Commander, although it must be noted that this person will not attend the HSCC but will operate at a strategic level from Network Rail HQ in Glasgow.

On arrival at the HSCC, the RIO will:

- Identify themselves to security staff.
- Proceed to the designated accommodation position.
- Confirm their arrival to Network Rail Control and to other agencies.
- In liaison with other agencies at the HSCC and Network Rail Control, formulate rail industry strategy and facilitate its implementation.

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14.13 NHS Ayrshire and Arran

14.13.1 Roles and Responsibilities

Provision is made for a response to medical emergencies as a normal feature of the work of the NHS. The role of the NHS encompasses health care and the protection of public health.

Emergency arrangements have been made by the NHS to deal with the treatment of large numbers of casualties, public health incidents and the treatment of casualties contaminated with radiation or toxic materials, i.e.

- *NHS Ayrshire and Arran Major Incident Plan.*

In response to an incident at the Hunterston Site the NHS responsibilities may be summarised as making provision for:

1. Arrangements for the reception and treatment of casualties.
2. The coordination of NHS arrangements with the emergency services, local authorities and where appropriate, the site operator.
3. Patients who are contaminated with radioactive material and have a life threatening injury will be decontaminated at the hospital and monitoring will be undertaken by NHS Ayrshire and Arran staff.
4. Monitoring of members of the public and attendants who are, or who may be contaminated with radioactive material in the immediate post incident period.
5. Establish and chair a Scientific Technical Advice Cell which will provide appropriate and definitive advice to protect the public and responders.
6. Participation in the Strategic, Tactical and Recovery Working Group at the HSCC.,
7. Liaise with Scottish Government Health and Social Care Directorate and with other NHS Boards.
8. Subsequent validation monitoring of a sample of the population to confirm calculated assessments of population exposure or monitoring of individuals who have reason to suppose that they have been exposed to higher than average levels of contamination.

14.13.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

1. Public Health will monitor the ongoing on site incident.

There will be close communication and liaison between all parts of NHS Ayrshire and Arran.

Off-site Nuclear Emergency

1. When notified by Police Scotland the Consultant in Public Health Medicine (CPHM) on-call will attend the HSCC with a STAC support team, incorporating staff from the Public Health Dept. and administrative support. The Chief Executive / Director on call will take on the Strategic role at the multi agency meetings within the HSCC to ensure coordination of NHS arrangements with those of the site operator and other services.
2. As part of the emergency countermeasures actions it may be necessary to issue Stable Iodine Tablets. The authority to issue these tablets is that of the DPH, however in the event of the DPH or CPHM not being immediately available and there is a need to issue the tablets without delay, prior authorisation for commencement of issue in these circumstances has been given to the Site Emergency Controller at Hunterston B Power Station.

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3. Make arrangements to receive any seriously injured externally contaminated casualties at [REDACTED] and to deal with any potentially contaminated self presenters.
4. If required arrange for the collection of additional Stable Iodine Tablets from local and national stocks.
5. Implement the Ayrshire Radiation Monitoring Unit Plan if activated by Strategic.
6. There will be close communication and liaison between all parts of NHS Ayrshire and Arran. There may be a need to open the NHS Coordination Centre in such circumstances.

Health and Social Care Partnership

1. If required arrange for staff to attend an appropriate venue to issue Stable Iodine Tablets to members of the public that require them following a potential exposure to radioactive iodine.

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14.14 North Ayrshire Council (incl. Glasgow Scientific Services)

14.14.1 Roles and Responsibilities

1. To discharge the legislative requirements placed upon it by the *Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001*, by preparing, maintaining and exercising an Off-site Emergency Plan for Hunterston “B” Nuclear Power Station Site.
2. To provide appropriate support to all relevant agencies in their response to the emergency.
3. To provide welfare, care and support to people affected by the emergency staff responding to, an incident both in the short and long term.
4. To provide temporary accommodation to local residents, or holidaymakers, who require to be evacuated by the police from their homes/ accommodation.
5. In liaison with the other authorities, ensure the public is kept adequately informed with regular and accurate information.
6. In conjunction with other agencies prevent / limit any damage or pollution of the environment.
7. To endeavour to return the situation to normal as soon as possible without jeopardising the effectiveness of the emergency response.
8. To provide the Strategic Coordinator during the Recovery Phase.

Glasgow Scientific Services

10. Liaise with Environmental Health regarding a suitable sampling protocol for food, water and other appropriate environmental substances.
11. Analyse samples for radioactivity received from, and report back to, North Ayrshire Council / STAC.

14.14.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

When notified of a Site Incident by the Police Service Overview, ACCT on behalf of North Ayrshire Council will, where appropriate, and through the Services listed below, carry out the following:-

Chief Executive's

1. Liaise with Police Scotland to keep updated on situation.
2. Notify Executive Directors and Heads of Service and put on stand-by.
3. Appoint a Communications Officer who will liaise with EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation, and Police Scotland Corporate Communications Officers to ensure no conflicting press and media releases.
4. Keep Elected Members of the Council informed.

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Off-site Nuclear Emergency

When notified of an Off-site Nuclear Emergency by Police Scotland Service Overview, ACCT on behalf of North Ayrshire Council will, where appropriate, and through the Services listed below, carry out the following:-

CHIEF EXECUTIVE'S

Democratic Services:

1. [REDACTED] Arrange for appropriate representatives to attend the [REDACTED]
2. Be represented at all multi agency meetings and briefings at the HSCC.
3. Initiate and coordinate the necessary response of Council resources as requested by the Emergency Organisations.
4. Inform Executive Directors and Heads of Service as appropriate
5. [REDACTED] Establish the Council Emergency Control Centre [REDACTED]
6. Arrange for mutual assistance, initially from South and East Ayrshire Councils if required.
7. Notify other adjacent Local Authorities (see Section 14.11).
8. On completion of the incident carry out an internal debrief with those Services responding to the incident, notifying any amendments required to the Plan and highlighting best practices.
9. Incorporate the necessary amendments to the multi-agency review of this Plan.

Corporate Communications

1. A communications officer will be appointed to liaise with the Site Operators representative and Police Scotland Corporate Communications to ensure cohesion in all press and media releases.
2. Keep Elected Members of the Council informed.
3. Coordinate the NAC response to any public helpline requirements.
4. Participate in the SMAC
5. Assist in the Communications strategy by liaising with EDF Energy and the Police Corporate Communications to ensure no conflicting press and media releases.
6. Update Council website and media streams including Council Customer Services as required and appropriate.

ECONOMY AND COMMUNITIES

Environmental Health

1. Consult with appropriate agencies regarding (possible) pollution of the environment and ensure relevant remedial and recovery measures are implemented.
2. Liaise with Glasgow Scientific Services in connection with the above.
3. Sample milk, water or other products if appropriate.
4. Attend STAC meetings.
5. Liaison with STAC / Public Health.
6. Undertake environment monitoring where appropriate.
7. Provide advice on the location of suitable premises for the accommodation of displaced pets.
8. Provide advice to the Recovery Working Group, where established.

Trading Standards

1. Liaise with SGRPID to advise farming community on the effect of radiation.
2. Liaise with SGRPID in the enforcement of emergency animal movement legislation.
3. Assist with the monitoring of non-foodstuffs.

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Connected Communities

1. Arrange for the use of Community Centres that are required to be used as Emergency Rest Centre(s).

PLACE

Roads

1. Provision of signs and resources to assist in road closures and diversions.
2. Arrange for the closure of gate at Hunterston Castle on the Ayrshire Coastal path.

Internal Transport

1. The provision of transport, if required and safe to do so, to take evacuees to / from any Rest Centre (s)
2. Coordinating the provision of any transport requirements.
3. Liaise with SEPA on the disposal of contaminated waste.
4. Provision of plant, transport and labour

Facilities Management

1. The provision of catering services for affected people at Emergency Rest Centre(s).

Housing

1. Responsibility to provide alternative / temporary accommodation for members of the public evacuated to Emergency Rest Centre(s).
2. Assume responsibility for damaged property owned by the Service.

EDUCATION and YOUTH EMPLOYMENT

1. Evacuation of schools within the hazard area (if required).
2. After school hours, arrange for children living within the affected areas to be taken to Emergency Rest Centre(s).
3. Provide school closure information to Corporate Communications.

HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE PARTNERSHIP

1. The activation, staffing and management of the Emergency Rest Centre(s).
2. The temporary care of evacuees at the Emergency Rest Centre(s).
3. Identify any vulnerable persons within the affected population, assess their needs and respond accordingly.
4. Establish the Major Incident Support Team as required.
5. In conjunction with the Police Scotland, carry out the documentation of the evacuees
6. Coordinate the effort of the voluntary welfare organisations.

GLASGOW SCIENTIFIC SERVICES

1. Advise on a suitable sampling protocol for environmental materials for North Ayrshire Council, Environmental Health.
2. Prepare for receipt of environmental materials for radioactivity analysis.
3. Analyse environmental samples as and when they arrive, and report back results to ACCT / North Ayrshire Council, Environmental Health Officer.
4. Consult with appropriate agencies regarding possible contamination of the environment.

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14.15 Police Scotland

14.15.1 Roles and Responsibilities

Responding to emergencies is a normal feature of the work of Police Scotland. The normal roles and responsibilities of the Police encompass the protection of life, property and the environment.

In responding to an incident at Hunterston “B” Nuclear Power Station Site, the Police responsibilities can be summarised as follows:

1. The saving of life in conjunction with other emergency services.
2. Coordination of the emergency services and other subsidiary organisations during the emergency phase of the incident.
3. To call out or place on standby essential services.
4. The protection and preservation of the scene.
5. The investigation of the incident in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable.
6. Identification of the victims on behalf of the Procurator Fiscal who is the principal investigator when fatalities are involved.
7. The collation and dissemination of casualty information.
8. The restoration of normality at the earliest opportunity.
9. Coordination of the response to the media.
10. Application of countermeasures to protect the public.

14.15.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

On receipt of the message alerting Police Scotland to the incident the following action will be progressed:

1. Immediately contact the On Call EPA who shall contact the Atomic Weapons Establishment **AWE** (who are Police Scotland’s Radiation Protection Advisor **RPA**) who shall provide specialist briefings **PRIOR** to officers being deployed.
2. Alert the agencies shown in **Section 1.1** (Site Incident) by repeating verbatim the message received from EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation
3. **Having first ascertained that it is safe to do so and identifying a safe access route**, send an Inspector to the appropriate Emergency Control Centre, Hunterston Site, to be briefed by the Emergency Controller and monitor the situation.
4. Establish liaison between the Emergency Control Centre and Police Scotland Service Overview, Glasgow.

Off-site Nuclear Emergency

Operational Dose Limit

The Operational Dose Limit for an incident attended by the Police which is not a radiation emergency is 5 milli-Sieverts (mSv) (*Ionising Radiation Regulations 2017*).

Emergency Dose Limits

The Emergency Dose Limit is dependent upon the circumstances of the incident and the individual’s circumstances. For example, a female who has declared a pregnancy has a lower limit. For detailed guidance please refer to NPCC National Police Chiefs Council Operational Response to the Police Service for Operations & Incidents Involving Radiation.

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In a radiation emergency the following Dose Limits apply:

- Emergency Exposure Dose Limit 1: 100 mSv. This applies to simple non-life saving rescues, maintaining important plant and reducing further doses to responders and the public
- Emergency Exposure Dose Limit 2: 500 milli-Grays (mGy). This applies to life saving intervention only and also includes intervention to save critical infrastructure which, if not attended, may yet threaten public and / or responder life.

The above guidance states:

“under REPPiR, all personnel to receive an emergency exposure **MUST** be an informed volunteer. An informed volunteer is a person that:

- Is not under undue pressure from others to undertake the intervention and volunteers of their own accord;
- Has received a suitable briefing on the work to be undertaken and understands the risks and hazards involved in undertaking the intervention;
- Has had the opportunity to ask any questions regarding the radiological and general safety aspects of the intervention to be undertaken.
- Understands that they can decide not to undertake the intervention at any time if they choose to do so.

****NB**** It is a requirement that supervisors with briefing responsibilities are trained and understand the above guidance and that they must **not** task any police service staff or officers inappropriately. Incident specific briefings will come from the RPA, AWE.

Dosimeters will be provided at the ACP for use.

On receipt of the message alerting Police Scotland to the Off-site Nuclear Emergency the following action will be progressed:-

1. Immediately contact the On Call EPA who shall contact the Atomic Weapons Establishment **AWE** (who are Police Scotlands' Radiation Protection Advisor **RPA**) who shall provide specialist briefings **PRIOR** to officers being deployed.
2. Alert the Agencies shown in **Section 1.2** (Off-site Nuclear Emergency) repeating verbatim the message received from EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation.
3. Establish liaison between the Emergency Control Centre and Police Scotland Service Overview, Glasgow.
4. **Having first ascertained that it is safe to do so and identifying a safe access route** send an Inspector to the appropriate Emergency Control Centre, Hunterston Site, to be briefed by the Emergency Controller and monitor the situation.
5. Confirm with the site operator(s) that the DEPZ automated warning system has been actuated.
6. Establish a Forward Control Post (**Section 8.2**).
7. Establish and manage the Rendezvous Point (**Section 8.2**).
8. Establish traffic control points. (**Section 8.11**).
9. Send an officer to the HSCC of appropriate rank to commence setting up the HSCC and to perform the role of Police Cell Manager and deputy Tactical Commander.
10. Send an officer to the HSCC of an appropriate rank to perform the role of Strategic Coordinator along with relevant supporting staff.
11. Police Scotland Corporate Communications shall issue holding statement to the media. (**Section 7.3.2**).

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12. Send the Divisional Commander or representative to the HSCC to act as Tactical Commander along with a relevant support team. The Tactical Commander will also represent Police Scotland at the Strategic Coordinating Group.
13. Establish an Incident Control Point.
14. Deploy resources to manage the media response.
15. Provide security for the HSCC / MBC.
16. Provide officer to perform Briefing Officer Role.
17. Implement a message / action system within the HSCC.
18. Provide officer to perform role as STAC representative.
19. Provide officer to perform role as RWG representative.
20. Establish Casualty Bureau if required.
21. Implement the decision of the Tactical Commander / Strategic Coordinator to coordinate the progression of countermeasures prior to the HSCC being established.
22. Send Documentation Teams to receiving Hospitals and Rest Centre(s) if applicable.
23. Investigate incident and report to the Procurator Fiscal if circumstances dictate.

NB. *The above information is currently being reviewed and shall be updated upon Police Scotland receiving the latest version of the 'NPCC Operational response to the Police Service for Operations & Incidents involving Radiation' document.*

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14.16 Public Health England - Centre for Radiation Chemicals and Environmental Hazards (PHE CRCE)

14.16.1 Radiation Monitoring Teams and Monitoring Coordination

A fundamental component of the Public Health England (PHE) Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards (CRCE) radiation emergency response plan is maintenance of capability to deploy radiation monitoring teams capable of measuring environmental contamination and undertaking measurements of radioactivity on or in people. Teams can be deployed from Chilton, Leeds and Glasgow. Their deployment and tasking is controlled by the Monitoring Control team leader based in the Chilton Emergency Centre who reports directly to the PHE CRCE Operations Director.

14.16.2 In addition to deployment and management of CRCE monitoring teams, PHE also has a national monitoring coordination role during radiation emergencies, which is managed by CRCE. PHE will coordinate the monitoring resources made available to it in the event of an emergency and prepare a monitoring strategy for approval by the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG). This responsibility covers the responsibility for monitoring people and the environment. It does not change or re-allocate any existing responsibilities that organisations might hold with regards to radiation monitoring. PHE has no power to commandeer resources and PHE would not expect to take direct tactical control of any resources made available.

14.16.3 Each organisation is responsible for ensuring that their staff are properly trained, and its resources are adequately maintained. Operational responsibility would be retained at each monitoring organisation's emergency centre. PHE CRCE will periodically provide organisations with what information it has as the incident develops, this should include:

- A summary of the incident situation
- PHE CRCE local rules for its own monitoring teams being deployed
- PHE CRCE radiological risk assessment for its own monitoring teams being deployed.

Organisation's monitoring teams will however need to:

1. Be self sufficient in respect of their own accommodation, transport, meals, communications etc;
2. Have appropriate health physics skills to competently carry out the agreed monitoring tasks;
3. Work under the supervision of their own management structures; and
4. Be self sufficient in terms of PPE (including RPE where appropriate).

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14.17 Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE)

- 14.17.1 It is anticipated that the SAGE will be activated in support of Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) for all nuclear emergencies where 1) there has been an off-site release of radiological material, 2) an off-site release is considered possible or 3) there is an incident that has serious implications for the site itself and those on it.
- 14.17.2 During COBR activation, SAGE is responsible for coordinating and peer reviewing, as far as possible, scientific and technical advice to inform national-level decision-making. SAGE also supports Ministers in making evidence based decisions on key national policy questions. During a nuclear scenario, it is anticipated that SAGE will focus on three primary subject areas – peer review of the Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC), horizon scanning (e.g. understanding how the situation may evolve), and on-site technical diagnosis / prognosis.
- 14.17.3 **Peer review of scientific advice**
SAGE provides expert oversight of the scientific advice informing emergency response decision-making through its peer review function. SAGE will and must have a close, collaborative and supportive working relationship with the STAC, which will advise the SCG at the local strategic level on protective measures. In this role, SAGE peer reviews and adds value to local scientific advice (and the information/assessments it is based upon), providing subsequent reassurance to COBR (and STAC itself) that this advice is appropriately shaping decisions. Despite the close working and information sharing between SAGE and STACs, STACs remain accountable to SCGs and does not in any circumstance become a sub-committee of SAGE, but remains focused on the advice requirements at the local level.
- 14.17.4 **Horizon scanning function**
SAGE's horizon scanning function contributes to government's responsibility to determine the likely development of the emergency, by using joint agency modelling and assessment (JAM) based on available scientific and technical data. JAM delivery partners provide SAGE with an evolving but consolidated projection of how the event will develop. This allows government to ensure an effective response across a range of credible scenarios by preparing in advance for potential future events.
- 14.17.5 **Site technical diagnosis/prognosis**
This function requires SAGE to examine the events occurring at the nuclear site (or, if the event is transportation, the incident site) from a technical perspective, to understand the developing scenario and what is being done to bring the incident under control. Again, this will focus on understanding how events could unfold in the future. This will require close interaction and cooperation with the site operator (or carrier), STAC and nuclear regulator.
- 14.17.6 Communication between SAGE and STAC is essential to ensure a coordinated approach. The chairs of both SAGE and STAC should be in regular contact. The STAC chair will dial into SAGE and vice versa. The chair of SAGE will also dial directly into SGoR meetings.

For further information, see Nuclear Response Guide for the SAGE:

<https://www.resilience.gov.uk/RDSservice/home/64023/Scientific-Advisory-Group-for-Emergencies>

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14.18 Scottish Ambulance Service

14.18.1 The purpose of the Service is to provide immediate care to patients at the scene of an incident and care during transportation, to, from and between healthcare facilities. To supplement road transport, the Service operates and controls an integrated air ambulance service using fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

14.18.2 In the case of an incident requiring decontamination of people exposed to hazardous substances in the community the Service would assume responsibility for the triage and decontamination of those affected, as an extension of normal operational or major incident procedures.

14.18.3 In responding to an incident at any location in Scotland, responsibilities may be summarized as follows:

- The saving of life and the provision of immediate care to patients at the scene of the incident and in transit to hospital.
- The alerting of hospital services, immediate care GPs and other relevant NHS agencies.
- The management of decontamination for people affected by hazardous substances, prior to evacuation from the scene.
- The evacuation of the injured from the scene in order of medical priority.
- Arranging and ensuring the most appropriate means of transport for the injured to the receiving hospital.
- The supply of patient care equipment to the scene of a major incident.
- To arrange the transportation of appropriate medical staff and their equipment to the scene of a major incident.
- Alerting and coordinating the work of the Voluntary Aid Societies acting in support of the ambulance service at the incident site.
- The provision and maintenance of communications equipment for medical staff and appropriate Voluntary Aid Society personnel at the scene of a major incident.
- The restoration of normality.

14.18.4 Action at the scene:

- The Ambulance Incident Commander (AIC) is in command of ambulance service operations on site. The AIC will work in liaison and coordination with the MC, if present, and the other emergency services.
- Tactical considerations may be summarized as:

Command and Control
Safety
Communications

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Assessment of requirements

Triage

Treatment

Transport

14.18.5 The AIC will, as appropriate:

- Ensure that command roles such as Forward Ambulance Incident Commander(s) (FAIO) and Casualty Clearing Officer are established.
- Ensure that key points of activity such as the Ambulance Control Point and Casualty Clearing Station, Ambulance Loading Point and Parking Point are established.
- Ensure that all NHS and Voluntary Aid resources attend the RVP and report to the Ambulance Control Point for documentation and tasking.
- Brief personnel and deploy resources to triage, treat or transport patients.
- Ensure that appropriate dynamic triage and labeling of casualties is carried out using standard triage systems (sieve and sort), in consultation with the MC, if present.
- Develop a casualty evacuation and distribution plan, in consultation with MC, if present, coordinated and documented at the Ambulance Control Point and communicated to ambulance control and receiving hospitals.
- Request additional / special resources, including personnel or bulk patient care equipment to be delivered by air.
- Liaise with the police regarding patient destination, transportation of patients by air ambulance / MOD helicopter, scene management and any requests for ambulance assistance at Rest Centres or other sites.
- Participate in regular Coordinating Group meetings arranged by the Police.
- Ensure that suitable arrangements are made for relief, welfare and health and safety of ambulance personnel.
- Make suitable arrangements for media liaison, in cooperation with the other emergency services.

Note "Scottish Ambulance Service will, in the first instance, report to the [REDACTED] and will only proceed to the Hunterston Site when it is declared safe to do so" Dosimeters will be provided at the ACP for use.

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14.19 Scottish Environment Protection Agency

14.19.1 Roles and Responsibilities

SEPA is responsible for environmental protection in Scotland and adopts an integrated approach to the protection and enhancement of water, air and land and associated natural resources. SEPA is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the *Radioactive Substances Act 1993*. Under the Act SEPA is responsible for the authorisation of radioactive discharges and disposals from the site and maintains an independent monitoring regime for radioactivity in food and the environment around the site.

During an emergency SEPA may make environmental measurements in support of its function and may contribute any environmental measurement capability to other organisations involved. SEPA will, if requested, provide advice to government on sampling and measurement of radioactive contamination in the environment, potable and surface waters, and the food chain. SEPA will advise on and authorise the disposal of any radioactive wastes arising as a result of an incident. SEPA will also advise on any off site decontamination undertaken in the remediation phase. SEPA will ensure that information passed from the HSCC/SCG/STAC to the SEPA Radioactive Substances Technical Hub is entered on the RIMNET system.

14.19.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

1. Investigate and take appropriate action with respect to enforcement duties.

Off-site Nuclear Emergency

In responding to the incident SEPA will

1. Provide appropriate representatives, as required, to meet local coordination arrangements.
2. Set up and staff SEPA Radioactive Substances Technical Hub.
3. Provide advice on the environmental impact of a radiological incident to relevant organisations.
4. Provide information on the environmental effects of the incident where appropriate.
5. Maintain operational links with appropriate organisations to ensure an integrated response to the incident.
6. Advise on appropriate disposal of radioactive waste and, if appropriate, authorise such disposals.
7. Determine if a breach of site authorisation has occurred and gather relevant information if necessary.

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14.20 Scottish Fire and Rescue Service

14.20.1 Roles and Responsibilities

Responding to emergencies is a normal function of the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service. These core responsibilities also include rescues from collapsed structures or major industrial incidents, the control of incidents involving hazardous materials and substances, the safeguarding of the environment, and the safety management of all persons in and around defined areas of Fire and Rescue operations.

Scottish Fire and Rescue Service is capable of rapidly mobilising trained personnel and a broad range of specialist appliances and rescue equipment. In an emergency situation, these resources and technical expertise may be utilised as directed by the Chief Fire Officer / Incident Commander to assist other agencies in discharging their respective roles.

14.20.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

On receipt of information reporting that an incident has occurred at the Hunterston Site the following actions will be initiated:

1. Scottish Fire and Rescue Service Operations Support Centre will mobilise an appropriate response in accordance with current Integrated Risk Management policy.
2. In accordance with established procedures the Operations Support Centre will confirm with other agencies, in particular Police Scotland Service Overview, that they also have received notification.
3. On arrival at the main security gate area appliances and personnel will be directed to the holding area to await further instructions. Dosimeters will be supplied at the ACP for use.
4. The Officer in Charge of the first attendance will, in conjunction with Site representatives if available, carry out a risk assessment on the nature and extent of the incident, the appropriate actions to be initiated and consider if any further Scottish Fire and Rescue Service resources or other service attendance is immediately required.
5. Scottish Fire and Rescue Service will assume control of all firefighting and rescue activities.

An Officer, of at least Watch Manager, level will be escorted to the Emergency Control Centre to act as the advisor and liaison officer for Scottish Fire and Rescue operations. The Officer performing this task need not be the Incident Commander but must at all times remain in radio contact with the Incident Commander. This Officer may be relieved of this duty as additional Senior Officers attend the incident.

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Scottish Fire and Rescue Service Liaison Officer will:-

1. Make contact with the Site Emergency Controller in order to gather information relevant to the incident.
2. Maintain radio contact with the Incident Commander at all times.
3. Utilise information from the Emergency Controller to assess the situation and in turn inform the Incident Commander, updating this information, as it becomes available.

The Incident Commander will: -

1. Assign an Officer to take charge of the holding area. This Officer will ensure that no person advances beyond this point except on the orders of the Incident Commander.
2. Remain at the holding area and await an assessment of the incident before formulating a plan of action.
3. Utilise this information when available, along with Scottish Fire and Rescue Service operational risk assessment data to form a plan of action, prioritising rescue, fire fighting and measures to deal with hazardous substances or situations, in accordance with documented Scottish Fire and Rescue Service procedures and at all times acting in coordination with the Fire and Rescue Liaison Officer.
4. Follow the instructions and recommendations of Health Physics Monitors to ensure that crews at work are not exposed to excessive doses of radiation or contamination.
5. Liaise with the AIC and MC (if present) on the priority rescues and evacuation of casualties.
6. Identify and request such additional resources as may be appropriate.
7. Implement the plan, maintaining operational control within the area of Fire and Rescue activity and liaison with the other Category 1 and Category 2 responders in attendance.
8. Continually evaluate the situation, the effectiveness of actions being taken, and any potential for development, preparing to brief a more Senior Officer on progress.
9. Participate in investigations as appropriate and prepare reports and evidence for enquiries
10. Standby during non-emergency recovery phase to ensure continued safety at the incident location area.

Oncoming Senior Officers, where appropriate, will take command at Tactical and Strategic levels. These Officers will act in consultation with all other agencies present to ensure a coordinated response to the incident.

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Off-site Nuclear Emergency

On receipt of the message alerting the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service to an incident requiring Hunterston Strategic Coordination Centre (HSCC) to come into operation, Scottish Fire and Rescue Service Operations Support Centre will mobilise the following officers:

- The Duty Assistant Chief Officer
- The Duty Area Manager
- Group Manager, HQ Operations (Response and Resilience) West Service Delivery Area HQ

On arrival Scottish Fire and Rescue Service representatives will:

1. Proceed to the designated accommodation position and activate the communications equipment.
2. Formulate the Fire and Rescue strategy and instigate its deployment.
3. Handle requests for information and carry out associated administrative tasks.
4. Gather information on Fire and Rescue activities.
5. Assess the effects of the incident on Scottish Fire and Rescue Service resources.
6. Provide advice and information to other Scottish Fire and Rescue Service Operations Support Centres.
7. Provide advice and information to the Centre Emergency Management Team to allow the overall scale of the incident and its likely development to be established so that suitable actions can be anticipated and planned for.

14.20.3 Dose Limits

The Ionising Radiation Regulations (2017) set limits for workers. The Fire and Rescue Service have generally adopted these limits.

Male: 20 mSv per year or single incident;

Female: 13 mSv in any consecutive period of 3 months or (Reproductive single incident with a maximum of 20mSv per year capacity)

Anyone: 100 mSv in exceptional circumstances and on a voluntary basis for life saving purposes.

14.20.4 National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer (NILO)

The NILO function compliments existing Strategic, Tactical and Operational inter-agency coordination. Within the Incident Command System (ICS) the role is defined as:

‘A trained and qualified officer who can advise and support Incident Commanders, police, medical, military and other government agencies on the FRS’s Operational capacity and capability to reduce risk and safety resolve incidents at which a FRS attendance may be required.’

The NILO role falls into two main functions:

- Proactive response: Intelligence led operations where the blue light services pre-planning focus will be on risk reduction, risk and asset management and communication

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- Reactive response and mobilising: Where the underpinning knowledge, skills of the other agencies capabilities can be used to bring the incident to a safe conclusion.

Therefore, the role of the NILO will include:

- Bridge the intelligence and information sharing between the partner agencies involved.
- Improve inter-agency planning, operational preparedness, liaison and response at emergencies, terrorist-related and other critical incidents.
- Improve cooperation and understanding amongst agencies on matters of organisational capacity, capability and command.
- Reduce risk to the public, operational personnel and the environment.

There are four main categories of incident types at which the NILO may be involved:

- Conventional and CBRN(E) terrorism, including MTFA
- Major Incidents
- Complex or protracted police led incidents
- Spontaneous and planned serious public order.

Note: Whilst the initial concept of the NILO was primarily focussed around the above incident types the skills can be utilised across a wide range of incidents.

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14.21 Scottish Government

14.21.1 Roles and Responsibilities

The Scottish Government is the Lead Government Department (LGD) in the event of an emergency at a civil nuclear site in Scotland.

The main functions of the Scottish Government will be to:

- provide strategic national direction;
- capture and maintain situational awareness of the emergency, and brief Ministers;
- ensure effective communication between local, Scottish and UK levels, including the coordination of reports on the response and recovery effort;
- be the main source of information from central Government to the public and media;
- liaise with, and provide up-to-date information to UK Government to ensure that UK Ministers are briefed on the emergency;
- support the response and recovery efforts as appropriate, including appropriate allocation of national resources;
- provide the focal point on public health and NHS resilience issues at national level;
- animal welfare - provide advice and support activity to minimise the impact of radiation on food production and water supply.

14.21.2 Agreed Actions

Site Incident

No Action

Off-site Nuclear Emergency

On receipt of notification of a radiation emergency, the Scottish Government will:

- Activate its emergency response arrangements, and set up its emergency room, the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR).
- Deploy a Government Liaison Team including Scottish Government Liaison Officer (SGLO) to the HSCC to support the SCG and to liaise with SGoRR.

APHA

APHA is an agency of Defra, but works in Scotland on behalf of the Scottish Government

The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) is regulator for animal by-products (ABPs) legislation, including disposal of ABPs (eg animal carcasses and animal derived products including waste meat, milk etc). It oversees the approval, registration and inspection of ABP facilities. Regulator for animal welfare monitoring and animal diseases (including deliberately introduced diseases).

[Note: SEPA also regulates animal by-products where they are destined to be incinerated, landfilled, composted or to produce biogas].

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14.22 Scottish Water

14.22.1 Roles and Responsibilities

Scottish Water has responsibility for establishing procedures for protecting and decontaminating water treatment facilities, related infrastructure and the public water supply, maintaining sewerage treatment facilities, related infrastructure and protecting the aquatic environment. Scottish Water must be contacted immediately there is any indication of potential contamination to any raw water source or sewerage system, or potential for actual contamination of or damage to Scottish Water's water and wastewater infrastructure.

In responding to an incident at the Hunterston Site Scottish Water's responsibilities may be summarised as follows:

Public Water Supply

- Ensure that any immediate risks to Scottish Water staff / contractors working on the public water system are adequately controlled.
- Assess the risk of contamination of the public water supply (including raw water sources).
- Assess the risk / impact of damage to the water network and related infrastructure.
- Arrange and coordinate sampling and analysis of public water supplies (including raw water sources) as appropriate and where relevant, in conjunction with SEPA.
- Collate information on the level and nature of any contamination of public water supplies (including raw water) sources.
- Assess the risk to the public health from impacted / contaminated public water supplies, as per the multi-agency Scottish Waterborne Hazard Plan (SWHP)
- Assess the risks to staff, contractors, the public and other third parties including the environment of any damage to and / or contamination of the water infrastructure.
- Take measures to minimise the risk to public health from contaminated public water supplies.
- In coordination and where appropriate, agreement with other stakeholders, take the required measures to minimise risks to Scottish Water staff, contractors, the public and other third parties including the environment of any contamination of the public water infrastructure.
- Provide advice to customers and Licenced Service Providers (LRPs) on public water supplies in accordance with the Public Health Guidelines issued.
- Where there is a disruption to the public water supply, Scottish Water will, with the support of Police Scotland and other relevant stakeholders arrange for the provision of alternative supplies of drinking water.
- In consultation and agreement with SEPA, HPS, PHE and other stakeholders, take the required measures to decontaminate and / or recover impacted public water infrastructure.

Sewerage (Wastewater) Network

- Ensure that any immediate risks to Scottish Water staff / contractors working on the sewerage system are adequately controlled.
- Assess the risk of contamination to the wastewater network and related infrastructure.
- Assess the risk / impact of damage to the wastewater network and related infrastructure.
- Arrange and coordinate sampling and analysis of process, point discharges, sludge and other relevant environmental samples in conjunction with SEPA and other stakeholders.

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- Collate information on the level and nature of the contamination of the wastewater network and related infrastructure.
- Assess the risks to Scottish Water staff, contractors, the public and other third parties including the environment of any damage to and / or contamination of the wastewater network and related infrastructure.
- In coordination and where appropriate agreement with SEPA and other stakeholders take the required measures to minimise risks to Scottish Water staff, contractors, the public and other third parties including the environment of any contamination of the wastewater network and related infrastructure
- In consultation and agreement with SEPA, HPS, PHE and other stakeholders take the required measures to decontaminate and /or recover any impacted areas of the wastewater network and related infrastructure.

14.22.2 Initial Actions

The alerting party must inform Scottish Water that the incident location is Hunterston Nuclear Power Station and where appropriate that the incident is a “Radiation Emergency”. A specific request must be made to talk to the **Duty Emergency Planning Support (DEPS)**.

The Scottish Water member of staff receiving the call will either transfer the call direct to the DEPS or if it is outwith normal working hours call the DEPS and arrange for them to contact the raiser of the alert. The DEPS will then contact the raiser.

Notes: The caller must have their contact details ready in order that these can be taken by the Scottish Water member of staff in case the initial phone call is disrupted.

It is important that Scottish Water is immediately advised if the Hunterston Strategic Coordination Centre has been activated in order that the appropriate staff can be mobilised as rapidly as possible.

See **Section 17.1** for details of how to contact Scottish Water

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15 Plan Review, Amendment and Records

15.1 Terms of Reference of the Contingency Plan Liaison Group

A Contingency Plan Liaison Group has been established from the Emergency Planning Consultative Committee to progress a multi-agency Off-site Contingency Plan in respect of Hunterston B Nuclear Power Station promoting mutual understanding of roles, identification of responsibilities and coordination of response, to enable an efficient and effective response to a Site Incident or an off site Nuclear Emergency. The Contingency Plan Liaison Group will:

1. Call a meeting on an annual basis of the Contingency Plan Liaison Group to review the plan.
2. Produce an Off-site Contingency Plan as required by the *Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001*.
3. Adopt if applicable national best practice.

The Contingency Plan Liaison Group should at all times bear in mind the objectives of the Emergency Organisation responsible for responding to a Site Incident or an off site Nuclear Emergency.

Amendments of an administrative nature can be introduced to the Off-site Contingency Plan by the Secretary without reference to the Contingency Plan Liaison Group.

15.2 Members of the Contingency Plan Liaison Group

- 15.2.1 All agencies named in this Plan have been invited to provide comment and/or representation for this group. A list of participating organisations is provided at the front of this document. (**Section 2.4.2**)

15.3 Emergency Planning Consultative Committee (EPCC) /Scottish Nuclear Resilience Group (SNRG)/Nuclear Emergency Planning Board (NEPB)

- 15.3.1 EPCC Terms of Reference provides a multi-agency forum for coordination of the emergency arrangements for Hunterston “B” Nuclear Power Station.

EPCC will:

3. Be responsible for approving the Off-site Emergency Plan
4. Be responsible for approving amendments to the Off-site Emergency Plan
5. Set a programme, attend and review exercises to test the Off-site Emergency Plan prepared for accidents that could occur at Hunterston B Power Station.

- 15.3.2 Chaired by the Scottish Government, Scottish Nuclear Resilience Group (SNRG) was set up in June 2008 through a partnership between Government and key stakeholders and organisations. Its role is to provide the strategic direction necessary to identify and progress actions which will improve nuclear emergency planning arrangements in Scotland. It is not intended to replace or replicate the NEPD but to act as the coordinating group for the deployment of guidance agreed at the NEPD.

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15.4 Review and Amendment of the Plan

15.4.1 REPPIR requires that this plan be reviewed at least three-yearly. In addition to the statutory reviews however amendments will also be issued as follows:

- Whenever changes of role, responsibilities or internal organisation of any participating agency necessitate it. Any such changes should be notified to the Ayrshire Civil Contingencies Team, as they occur.
- To incorporate lessons learned from exercises or real incidents.
- To incorporate best practice established within the nuclear industry or the emergency response community.
- To comply with changes in legislation.

15.4.2 ACCT will be responsible for ensuring that any necessary inter-agency consultation is completed prior to amendments being incorporated into the plan.

15.5 Testing

15.5.1 All elements of the plan will be tested within a three year cycle by the use of live play and/or desk top exercises this will support us going forward into modular testing of the Off-site Plan.

15.6 Training

15.6.1 It is the responsibility of each organisation to ensure that officers are trained appropriately in respect of the roles and responsibilities of that organisation, and have an awareness of the wider multi-agency organisation, in the context of this contingency plan.

15.7 Records


15.7.1 ACCT will be responsible for keeping records of all amendments and any relevant correspondence pertaining to the Plan.

15.8 Costs

15.8.1 Costs may be recovered by the Local Authority, from the operator, for the preparation and testing of the Off-site Contingency plan.

16.7 Location Map – HSCC / MBC

16.7.1 Hunterston Strategic Coordination Centre



Travel Directions

Hunterston Strategic Coordination Centre (HSCC)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


[Redacted]

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16.7.2 Media Briefing Centre (Greenwood Conference Centre)

Location Map – Media Briefing Centre at Greenwood


Directions



16.7.3 Media Briefing Centre (Greenwood Conference Centre)

Location Map – Media Briefing Centre at [REDACTED] (if agreed)

This illustration has been removed



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17 Contact Identification Information














17.1 External Telephone Numbers for Initial Contact (listed alphabetically)

Organisation	Contact Name	Office Hours	Out of Office Hours
British Telecom (confirmed correct: 2019 review)	National Emergency Link Line	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation Hunterston (confirmed correct: 2019 review)	Hunterston B Switchboard	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation Barnwood - CESC (confirmed correct: 14 Dec 2017)	Barnwood.cesc@edf-energy.com	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	Telephonist / Operator		
	Assistant CESC Controller CESC Fax		
Food Standards Agency (confirmed correct: : 2019 review)	24 Hour Nuclear Emergency	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Food Standards Scotland (confirmed correct: 2019 review)	Incidents Team	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Glasgow Scientific Services (confirmed correct: 2015 review)	Gary Walker Scientific Services Manager, Public Analyst [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
DEFRA DBRN Emergencies (confirmed correct: 2019 review)	CBRN Emergencies Team	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
	Defra Duty Office	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
HM Coastguard (confirmed correct: 2019 review)	Duty Officer	[REDACTED]	
HSCC (confirmed correct: 2019 review)	Security Desk / Initial Contact	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Magnox Ltd (confirmed correct: 2019 review)	Hunterston A Switchboard	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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Organisation	Contact Name	Office Hours	Out of Office Hours
Met Office Exeter (Public Weather Service Advisors for Scotland) (confirmed correct: 2018 review)	EMARC Desk Ross Melville Greg Wolverson	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
Network Rail (confirmed correct: 2019 review)	Emergency Number	[REDACTED]	
NHS Ayrshire and Arran: University Hospital Crosshouse (confirmed correct: 26 June 2018)	Ask for required department / service	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
NHS Ayrshire and Arran: Public Health Department (confirmed correct: 16 April 2019)	Ask for on Call Public Health Consultant	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
North Ayrshire Council <i>represented by</i> Ayrshire Civil Contingencies Team Representing North Ayrshire Council (confirmed correct: 2018 review)	Duty Officer	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Office for Nuclear Regulation (confirmed correct: 2019 review)	Duty Officer	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
PHE CRCE (confirmed correct: 2018 review)		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Police Scotland (confirmed correct: 2015 review)	Service Contact Centre		[REDACTED]
Police Scotland (confirmed correct: 18 December 2017)	Service Overview	[REDACTED]	
Prestwick Airport (confirmed correct: 2019 review)	Air Traffic Control	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Scottish Ambulance Service (confirmed correct: 2015 review)	Ambulance Control Centre	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Scottish Environment Protection Agency (confirmed correct: 2019 review)	Emergency Priority Helpline Communications Centre	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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Organisation	Contact Name	Office Hours	Out of Office Hours
Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (confirmed correct: 2015 review)	Operations Support Centre		
Scottish Government (confirmed correct: 16 May 2018)	Resilience Division		
Scottish Water (All numbers provided are available 24/7) In the first instance the call should be routed to the CEC and if this falls to the ICC and then the Customer Emergency Number (confirmed correct: 2018 review)	Customer Engagement Centre (CEC) Intelligent Control Room (ICC) Customer Emergency Number	  	  
UK Government – BEIS	Emergency Response 		

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17.2 Hunterston Strategic Coordination Centre Contact Telephone Numbers

The numbers below have been extracted from the HSCC User Guide Revised guide.

Copies of the HSCC User Guide are available on all desks

Operators Room

ORGANISATION / ROLE	PHONE NUMBER	EXT. NO.
EDF Energy Company Technical Advisor	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
EDF Energy Health Physicist	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
EDF Energy Admin Officer	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
EDF Energy Public Relations Officer	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
EDF Energy Public Relations Officer	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Fax In	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Fax Out	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Main Entrance

ORGANISATION / ROLE	PHONE NUMBER	EXT. NO.
Security Desk	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Security Desk (Airport Phone)	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Police Room

ORGANISATION / ROLE	PHONE NUMBER	EXT. NO.
Police Scotland	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Police Scotland	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Police Scotland	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Police Scotland	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Police Scotland	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Police Scotland	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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Police Scotland	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Police Scotland	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Strategic Coordinators Room

ORGANISATION / ROLE	PHONE NUMBER	EXT. NO.
Strategic Co-ordinator	01292 55 3213	3213
	01292 55 3232	3232

STAC Working Group Room

ORGANISATION / ROLE	PHONE NUMBER	EXT. NO.
STAC 1	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
STAC 2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
STAC 3	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
STAC 4	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Multi Agency Area

ORGANISATION / ROLE	PHONE NUMBER	EXT. NO.
British Telecom	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Food Standards Agency	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Food Standards Agency	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Government Liaison Officer	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Government Liaison Officer Assistant	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
HM Coastguard	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
HM Coastguard	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Network Rail	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
NHS	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
NHS Ayrshire & Arran	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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NHS Ayrshire & Arran	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
NHS Ayrshire & Arran	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
North Ayrshire Council	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
North Ayrshire Council	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
North Ayrshire Council	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
North Ayrshire Council	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Office for Nuclear Regulation Lead	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Office for Nuclear Regulation Assistant	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Office for Nuclear Regulation Team	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Public Health England CRCE	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Public Health England CRCE Assistant	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Scottish Ambulance Service	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Scottish Ambulance Service	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Scottish Fire & Rescue Service	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Scottish Fire & Rescue Service	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Scottish Government	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Scottish Government	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Scottish Water	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Scottish Water	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
SCC Co-ordination (Main)	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
SCC Co-ordination	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
SCC Co-ordination	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
SCC Co-ordination	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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Briefing Area

ORGANISATION / ROLE	PHONE NUMBER	EXT. NO.
Fax In	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Fax Out	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Prestwick Airport

NAME	RESPONSIBILITY	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Main Airport Number (24hr)	Security	[REDACTED]
Main Office	Car Parking	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	Property Manager	[REDACTED]

Media Briefing Centre

NAME	RESPONSIBILITY	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Media Briefing Centre Activation Phone Number <i>(Out of hours - ask for the ACCT Duty Officer to arrange the opening of the centre)</i>	Facility	[REDACTED]

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17.3 Glasgow Prestwick Airport Contact Telephone Numbers

Please refer to the numbers contained within the Hunterston SCC User Guide at 17.2.

17.4 Key Locations and Contact Telephone Numbers

Address	Telephone Number
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

17.5 Incident Controller Identification

17.5.1 Tabards and Surcoats



Hunterston Emergency Controller

Anyone attending the site should ask for the Hunterston Emergency Controller who will be recognisable by the above tabard.

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18 Airwave

18.1 Location and Airwave coverage

Hunterston B Power Station is located 3 miles South of Largs on the A78 in North Ayrshire. Airwave is primarily provided by STR *** Police Station with a number of secondary sites providing coverage should this site fail. Predicted coverage is level ** which provides good handheld coverage around the site and this level of coverage can be maintained from the next best site. STR ** has * base radios providing the capacity for up to ** simultaneous voice transactions. This should therefore have sufficient capacity to cover and incident at this location and normal airwave business in the area.

18.1.1 Initial Phase (Spontaneous Incidents Only)

Participant Group	Suggested Talkgroup	Alternative if In Use	Call Sign	Comments	ACR /Event Area Monitoring
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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Annexes

Annex A: Food Safety Information

Summary of food safety, livestock/animal health, milk, fish/shellfish and water responsibilities in the event of nuclear radiological emergency in Scotland

Food safety

- Food Standards Agency (FSA) will lead the food safety incident response unless it is mutually agreed that Food Standards Scotland (FSS) take over the lead.
- FSS will attend the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) in Scotland and link into the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR). FSA will link into COBR.
- FSA will provide radiological modelling which considers the long term effects of ingesting radioactive contamination and technical advice. FSS will provide precautionary food safety advice to food businesses and consumers.
- Public Health England (PHE) Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards (CRCE) will coordinate monitoring effort including both sampling and analysis for the assessment of the impact on the human food chain together with other monitoring programmes e.g. for the environment. FSA will coordinate the production of radiological food monitoring data/reports and provide to FSS, SEPA and PHE. FSA will provide up to date risk assessment advice to FSS who will work closely with SEPA, PHE, Local Authority Environmental Health/Trading Standards teams, Scottish Government (SG) including the SG Legal Department (SGLD), SG Animal Health and Welfare Division (SG AHWD), SG Rural Payments and Inspections Division (SG RPID), Marine Scotland and others to ensure that food controls are put in place.
- FSA and FSS will liaise to input into the appropriate monitoring programme for assessment of the impact on human foodstuffs.
- FSS will provide advice on food contamination issues to the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG), Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) and Recovery Working Group (RWG) within the SCC and responder organisations. FSA will liaise directly with the Science Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE).
- FSS may advise Scottish Ministers to issue statutory food restriction orders under the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 (FEPA¹), to restrict the supply, movement or sale of produce from the affected area. This is to ensure that contaminated food, which may pose a risk to human health, does not enter the food chain. FSS will liaise with SGLD, SG Agriculture Food and Rural Communities (AFRC) Directorate and Local Authorities to develop the FEPA, which once in place, is enforced by Local authority enforcement officers or Marine Scotland if the affected area is offshore outwith the Local Authority's jurisdiction.
- SEPA will provide advice to ensure contaminated foodstuffs are disposed of appropriately in accordance with the best advice available e.g. UK Recovery Handbooks for Radiation Incidents

1. SEPA is responsible for developing advice for multi-agency responders regarding disposal routes and availability.

¹ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-recovery-handbooks-for-radiation-incidents-2015> 2

¹ FEPA powers are used to make emergency orders in relation to any type of hazard which poses or may pose a risk to human health through food

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Livestock and animal health

- In implementing food safety advice and controls, animal welfare issues must also be considered. For example, it may be possible to shelter animals and switch off ventilation to reduce exposure to contamination but this may not be suitable for prolonged periods. Therefore, for animal welfare reasons it may be appropriate to allow some exposure to radioactivity even where this means the animals will no longer be suitable for food production. This may be a decision for STAC and the SCG within the SCC in conjunction with FSS, SG AHWD and the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)².
- SG AHWD will provide advice and support activity to minimise the impact of the radiological contamination of livestock.
- SG AHWD's policy responsibilities include the health and welfare of livestock, working, companion and zoo animals.
- FSS, following liaison with FSA and SG AHWD, will consider the need for advisory and statutory controls on livestock movements on the basis of food safety and AHWD will consider the need for similar measures on the basis of welfare. If restrictions are required, FSS will share food risk assessments with SG AHWD to inform animal welfare decisions.
- SG AFRC Directorate will coordinate communication with farms on the movement of livestock.
- SG AFRC Directorate will provide guidance to STAC / farmers on the milking of cattle.
- SG RPID will be available to offer on the ground local agricultural knowledge to FSS, as required.
- Local Authority Environmental Health/Trading Standards enforcement teams will provide information regarding locations of food businesses and farms in the vicinity, as required.
- APHA will undertake some of the practical work on SG's behalf, such as providing local veterinary advice where appropriate.
- The Strategic team and STAC within the SCC, in conjunction with FSS, SG, Local Authorities and APHA will take decisions on matters such as the need for evacuation of animals, the housing of evacuated animals, particularly companion animals, and movement restrictions.

Milk

- For milk consumption, FSA will undertake a risk assessment to decide if restrictions on the supply of milk are required.
- FSS will work with local authorities to enforce any restrictions as required and make arrangements for the monitoring and analysis of milk from affected farms.
- SEPA will provide advice to the STAC on the potential disposal of any affected milk. Local responders at STAC may need to agree the options for the disposal of milk and this may need to be escalated to SAGE if disposal cannot be managed locally.
- SG AFRC Directorate will provide guidance to STAC / farmers on the milking of cattle.

² An agency of the Department for Food, Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) that works on behalf of Scottish Ministers

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Fish/Shellfish

- FSA will carry out a risk assessment to determine if shellfish harvesting restrictions are required. FSS hold details of the various shellfish harvesting sites around Scotland. SEPA and Marine Scotland can provide advice and information on freshwater fisheries and aquaculture.
- FSS will also liaise with Marine Scotland should sea fish be affected by the nuclear radiological emergency.
- FSS will liaise with Local Authorities, SEPA and Marine Scotland who hold details of approved fishery establishments.

Water

- The Drinking Water Quality Regulator for Scotland is responsible for ensuring that water supplies are safe to drink, and will work with stakeholders such as Scottish Water, local authorities and health boards to coordinate work to preserve safe public and private drinking water supplies and provide consistent advice to consumers in accordance with the UK Recovery Handbook for Radiation Incidents – Drinking Water Supplies².
- Scottish Water will issue advice to Domestic Customers and agree the message to be communicated with Business Users with the Licenced Service Providers who provide the retail elements of water and sewerage service provision to non-household customers in Scotland.
- Local authorities will issue advice to the owners of private water supplies on any actions they should take, following guidance from government and health professionals.
- Scottish Water will undertake a programme of sampling to monitor water quality.
- SEPA will provide advice on the impact of any contamination in the environment including water courses and the potential impact on both public and private water supplies.
- FSS, following liaison with FSA, will provide advice on bottled water products and use of water in food production.

² https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/433689/PHE-CRCE-018_Drinking_Water_Supplies_Handbook_2015.pdf

Further guidance

National Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guidance

Nuclear Response Guide for the Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies (SAGE)

Preparing Scotland 4

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Annex B: Supporting Documentation

Title	Organisation	Date
<i>Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations</i>	Health and Safety Executive	2001
<i>Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019</i>	Health and Safety Executive	2019
UK Recovery Handbook for Radiation Incidents – Version 4	PHE CRCE	March 2015
<i>Benchmark Review of the Off-site Plan (Atkins Report 2009)</i>	HSE Nuclear Directorate	October 2009
Generic Emergency Plan	EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation	March 2010
<i>Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 6 (4) – Hazard Identification and Risk Evaluation (HIRE) Report</i>	EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation – Power Station	March 2017
Hunterston 'B' Power Station Emergency Plan Ref: HPS/EP Rev 20	EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation	January 2019
UK National Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Guidance (NNEPRG) – Concept of Operations, Planning, Response, Recovery	HM Government and Scottish Government	2015/16
Nuclear Response Guide for the Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies (SAGE)	DECC	2015
Preparing Scotland	Scottish Government	Various
<i>Civil Contingencies Response and Recovery Plan –</i>	North Ayrshire Council	February 2016
<i>Care for People Community Emergency Support Centre -procedural documents V10</i>	Pan-Ayrshire	2018
<i>Ambulance Service Guidance on Dealing with Radiological Incidents and Emergencies (Version 1.3)</i>	Scottish Ambulance Service	December 2013
<i>NHS Ayrshire and Arran Major Incident Plan</i>	NHS Ayrshire and Arran	Various dates
<i>West of Scotland Scientific Technical Advice Plan</i>	WoSRRP	March 2016
<i>WoSRRP Resilience Arrangements: Part 2 - Response and Recovery (Version 2)</i>	WoSRRP	February 2017
NPCC National Police Chiefs Council Operational Response to the Police Service for Operations & Incidents Involving Radiation.	The Association of Chief Police Officers	
<i>Food Standards Scotland Incident Management Plan</i> http://www.foodstandards.gov.scot/incident-management-plan	Food Standards Scotland	May 2015
<i>SOP / Tech note: A081: Hunterston Power Station</i>	Strathclyde Fire and Rescue Service	9 December 2011
<i>Hunterston Strategic Coordination Centre Guidance (Version 3)</i>	EDF Energy - Nuclear Generation – Power Station	April 2019
<i>Scottish Ambulance Service: Ionising Radiation Protection Procedures (IRPP)</i>	Scottish Ambulance Service	1999
<i>Disruptive Weather Response Arrangements</i>	Ayrshire Local Resilience Partnership	June 2018 (V5)

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